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We are all aware that there was a time in the western world when
punishment frequently revolved around the public humiliation of the offender.
Everyone likes to read about the picturesque barbarism of the old punishments:
the pillory, the stocks, the ducking stool, branding, and so on.' Many of us are
also dimly aware that such shame sanctions continue to be used in much of the
nonwestern world. It is common knowledge, for example, that public
humiliation of a dramatic sort was featured in the law of Maoist China; its
rituals of self-criticism, public admonition, and public exposure of offenders
are well known.2 It is also widely known that such shame sanctions have
continued to feature in the practice of the People's Republic,' where
,economic" criminals may still be trucked around town wearing signs
describing their offenses.4 Many countries other than China are known for
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employing such practices as well.' Most recently, the media have focused on
the humiliation rituals of the Islamic legal revival broadly, and of the Afghan
Taliban, in particular.6
The scattered reappearance of shame sanctions in the United States is a
surprise, however. Most of us, at least as of 1975 or so, would probably have
said that sanctions of the premodern type-sanctions whose main purpose is
the ritualized humiliation of the offender-had permanently vanished from our
legal landscape.7 Yet, as news magazines and newspapers have eagerly been
reporting, just such sanctions have begun to reappear.8 It is true that these
practices do not often assume the lurid shapes they took in the early-modern
or Maoist worlds. In particular, modern American shame sanctions lack the air
of physical violence that has commonly hung about the shame sanctions of
other times and places; American courts do not order offenders flogged,
dunked, or branded. The current American practice takes milder forms, such
as requiring offenders to wear shirts describing their crimes,9 publishing the
names of prostitutes' johns,' ° or (in a ritual not that far removed from the
Chinese one) making offenders sit outside public courthouses wearing
placards." Unlike the premodern punishments, none of these is inflicted in
the expectation that offenders will be physically assaulted. Perhaps the new
Patrick E. Tyler, Crime (and Punishment) Rages Anew in China, N.Y. TIMES, July I I, 1996, at Al, which
documents the rise of public punishments.
5. For a convenient compendium of nonwestem practices generally, see 4 LA PEINE, supra note 3. For
a discussion of public punishment in early-modem Germany, see RICHARD VAN DOLMEN, THEATRE OF
HORROR 42-57 (Elisabeth Neu trans., Polity Press 1990) (1985). For a discussion of such punishment in
late 18th-century Philadelphia, see MICHAEL MERANZE, LABORATORIES OF VImrUE 19-54 (1996). Other
literature is cited throughout this Essay.
6. See, e.g., Terence White, Man Accused of Illicit Sex Paraded Through Kabul Streets, Agence France
Presse, Dec. 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File; Terence White, Taliban Parade
Arrested Gamblers in Public with Blackened Faces, Agence France Presse, Nov. 30, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, AFP File. For an anecdotal account of shame sanctions in Iran, see Manuchehr
Sanadjian, A Public Flogging in South-Western Iran: Juridical Rule, Abolition of Legality and Local
Resistance, in INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE LAW 157, 157-68 (Olivia Harris ed., 1996).
7. One might have thought that the abolition of public whipping for most crimes in Delaware in 1972.
see Act of July 6, 1972, ch. 497, 58 Del. Laws 1611, marked the final decline of the old tradition. For a
discussion of the early traditions of public punishment in the United States, see generally LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1993). The one arena in which we do not
expect honor-based punishments to vanish is military law. Although I do not discuss military law in this
Essay, any full account of the history of shame sanctions in the western world would have to give attention
to it.
8. See, e.g., Jonathan Alter & Pat Wingert, The Return of Shame, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1995, at 21;
Beverly Shepard, A Public Slap on the Wrist, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 19, 1991, at Cl; Joseph R.
Tybor, Unusually Creative Judges Now Believe Some Punishments Can Fit the Times, CHI. TRIB., July 3,
1988, § 3, at I.
9. See, e.g., Creative Sentence Given to Shoplifter, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 2, 1992, at A3.
10. See Courtney Guyton Persons, Note, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency,
Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes' Patrons, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 1525, 1536-37 (1997) (documenting the common use of stigmatizing sanctions to punish prostitutes'
customers).
II. See, e.g., Across the USA: News from Every State, USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 1993, at 8A (discussing
a South Carolina man sentenced to sit outside the courthouse with a sign reading, "I am a Drunk Driver").
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shame sanctions seem more acceptable for that reason. Nevertheless, they do
not seem very acceptable. But why not?
In this Essay, I want to begin by admitting the truth that our familiar
liberal traditions do not give us any persuasive answer to this question. It may
seem intuitively obvious that shame sanctions are barbaric and wrong. It may
seem obvious that the abolition of public punishment was one of the triumphs
of the great age of enlightened reform in criminal law, a century and a half or
two centuries ago.' 2 Certainly, it is easy to find books and articles whose
authors think that there are fairly clear, and fairly damning, objections to the
use of shame sanctions. Some commentators, for example, argue that shame
sanctions are inordinately cruel to the offender; 3 others, that in a modem
society such sanctions cannot possibly have any effect at all.'
Nevertheless, courts are ordering shame sanctions. And, despite
expressions of discomfort, the American legal community seems unable to see
any decisive objection to them. 15 At least one American scholar, Dan Kahan,
has in fact cheerfully endorsed shame sanctions. 16 Another legal scholar, Toni
Massaro, has attacked them, 7 but even she has conceded that such sanctions
12. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Shame. Culture andAtnerican Crimnnal Law. 89 MICtt L REV 1880.
1942-43 (1991); see also infra Part 11 (discussing the argument that shame sanctions arc cruel to the
offender).
14. See, e.g., ADAM JAY HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THiE PFNrrENTrARY' PRISONS AND PuNISIIEN-T IN
EARLY AMERICA 38 (1992) (arguing that the pillory was no longer effective as a shame sanction "'w hen
performed before persons with whom offenders were unacquainted, and with sshom they need hase no
further personal contact"); see also infra Part I (discussing the argument that shame sanctions are
ineffective in modem society).
15. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), is an imposing baimer to any constitutional challenge to shame
sanctions. Paul involved the circulation by police officials of the names and photographs of persons arrested
for shoplifting. The Court held that reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interest such as
employment, does not implicate any liberty or property interests sufficient to insoke the procedural
protections of the Due Process Clause. See d. at 712. While some challenges to preconviction shaming of
the kind involved in Paul might conceivably still be mounted. cf Persons. supra note 10. at 1557-61
(proposing a Sixth Amendment challenge to preconviction shame sanctions), the fact remains that most of
the shame sanctions discussed in this Essay take the form of post-conviction probation conditions Here
again, commentators have tried to raise doubts, see. e.g.. Jon A. Bnlliant. Note. The Modern Da Scarlet
Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions. 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357 (arguing that the judictal
imposition of shame as a probation condition is a usurpation of the legislative function), and courts hase
occasionally stepped in, see, e.g., People v. Meyer. 680 N E.2d 315 (III. 1997) (holding that a court
exceeded its sentencing authority by imposing a shame sanction). Nevertheless. most courts that have
considered the issue have validated shame sanctions. See. e.g.. People s. McDossell, 130 Cal Rptr 839
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Goldschmitt v State.
490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Ballenger v. State. 436 S.E.2d 793 (Ga. Ct, App. 1993). People
v. Letterlough, 613 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); cf. State v. Bateman. 771 P.2d 314 (Or Ct. App.
1978) (affirming a shaming sentence on procedural grounds); Jeffrey C. Filclk. Signs of the Times Scarlet
Letter Probation Conditions, 37 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNsm'Emp. L. 291. 308-18 (1991) (reviesving judicial
scrutiny of probation conditions); Rosalind K. Kelley. Comment, Sentenced To Wear the Scarlet Letter:
Judicial Innovations in Sentencing-Are They Constitutional7. 93 DICK. L. REV 759 (1989) (discussing
the use of shame sanctions and endorsing humiliattng punishments in certain instances as a less restrictive
alternative to imprisonment).
16. See Dan M. Kahan, Ihat Do Alternative Sanctions Mean 1. 63 U. CHI L REV 591. 630-53
(1996).
17. See Massaro, supra note 13, at 1917-44.
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can be justified on the basis of any of the traditional theories of punishment.' 8
Nor has the inability to find objections to shame sanctions been confined to the
legal community. The editorial page of the New York Times itself has now
declared shame sanctions worth trying, at least under certain circumstances. 9
Obvious though it may seem that shame sanctions are objectionable, it is
unexpectedly difficult to give a name to what troubles us.
My plan in this brief Essay is to acknowledge this unpleasant truth-and
then to try, nevertheless, to give a name to what troubles us (or should trouble
us) about shame sanctions. 20 There is simply no straightforward liberal
tradition, I argue, that shows why engaging in the mere public display of
offenders, without corporal violence, is wrong. In particular, we can canvass
all of the great liberal arguments dating to the heroic era when the old shame
sanctions were principally abolished, from roughly 1750 to 1850, but we will
find oddly little that is ultimately of use. The classic reformers opposed the old
shame sanctions, by and large, for reasons that have almost no relevance to our
own age. Shame sanctions were abolished for reasons that have little to do
with contemporary American liberal theories.
Still, with some effort, we can see what is wrong with inflicting shame
sanctions. Doing so will require us, however, to reject some important and
appealing arguments. In the first place, it will require us to reject the argument
that shame sanctions can never work in a modem, anonymous society.
Contrary to this much-repeated argument, there is good reason to believe that
shame sanctions can work in the contexts in which they are most commonly
used-for sexual, commercial, and certain other offenses. Second, we will have
to retreat from the appealing position that shame sanctions are wrong because
of the way they treat the offender-that they are in some way inordinately
cruel. As Professor Kahan pointedly observes, it is hard to maintain that shame
sanctions, especially ones that do not involve corporal violence, are more cruel
than prison; and hard, in any case, to define in a persuasive way what is
"cruel" about them.2' There are ways in which we can think of shame
sanctions as "cruel," but these turn out to be unexpectedly complicated.2
In point of fact, I contend, the most compelling arguments against pure
humiliation sanctions-sanctions that involve only public exposure and not
corporal violence-do not have to do either with their ineffectuality or with
18. See id. at 1890-900 (concluding that shame sanctions can be justified on the basis of deterrence,
rehabilitation, retributivism, or incapacitation).
19. See Alternative Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1997, at A 16.
20. It bears emphasizing that my argument is largely one about intuitions, about our sense that thcre
is something wrong with shame sanctions. This carries with it the obvious danger that some readers will
never accept my account. This is not a danger that can be avoided. If our criminal law is, to any extent,
to be founded on a shared sense of what is right and what is wrong, then it must involve some coaxing and
preaching, and we must accept the truth that not all citizens will agree.
21. See Kahan, supra note 16, at 646.
22. As to those who have no sense that there is anything troubling about shame sanctions, I hope that
my efforts will have some effect on their sense as well.
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their cruelty. The most compelling arguments against such humiliation
sanctions do not, in fact, involve the way they deal with the offender at all. As
I try to show, the most compelling arguments against shame sanctions involve
the way they deal with the public, with society at large, with the crowd. In the
last analysis, we should think of shame sanctions as wrong because they
involve a species of lynch justice, and a peculiarly disturbing species of lynch
justice at that-a species of official lynch justice. The chief evil in public
humiliation sanctions is that they involve an ugly, and politically dangerous,
complicity between the state and the crowd. Shame sanctions are wrong in our
society for the same reason that we feel they are wrong in China, or in the
Afghanistan of the Taliban: They represent an unacceptable style of
governance through their play on public psychology. This evil is one that we
will never fully appreciate so long as we continue to focus exclusively on the
effects of shame sanctions on the offender. In fact, it is of no ultimate
importance whether shame sanctions are cruel or not. Shame sanctions would
be wrong even if they had no impact on the offender at all; for, no matter
what, they would represent an improper partnership between the state and the
crowd. Even if shame sanctions were wholly unobjectionable from the point
of view of punishment theory, they would still fail the test of a sane political
theory.
Such is my claim. I proceed by considering and rejecting a variety of
arguments against the infliction of shame sanctions. I divide these arguments,
in a rough way, into social arguments and political arguments. By social
arguments, I mean those that focus on how shame sanctions work within the
structure of a given society. One such argument is that shame sanctions do not
work at all in a modern society. I consider this contention in Part I. Two
classic reformist arguments should also be classified as social: first, that shame
sanctions are wrong because they promote the spirit of social hierarchy; and
second, that shame sanctions are wrong because they promote a spirit of public
indecency and brutality. These two classic arguments are my topic in Part II.
In Part III, I turn briefly to a different sort of social argument: the Christian
argument that a good society is better disciplined through privately experienced
guilt than through publicly experienced shame. After considering all of these
social arguments, I turn in Part IV to two political arguments, one classically
liberal argument and one classically statist argument. The liberal argument
holds that, while shame sanctions can be effective, the state has no business
inflicting them; only private citizens may use the sort of "moral" coercion
exerted through shaming. The statist argument holds that it is permissible, but
unwise, for the state to inflict shame sanctions, for public shaming can have
the dangerous consequence of stirring up riots and other mob actions. Neither
argument, I conclude, has any direct bearing on our current situation. Of the
two, however, the statist political argument is the one that carries the soundest
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kernel of truth. It is really the old statist fear of public riots that tells us the
most about the dangers of modern shaming.
Reviewing all of this will involve discussing a great deal of history, from
the eighteenth century through the Nazi period. For that very reason, I would
like to emphasize one point before beginning in earnest: This Essay is not
intended to be a history of anything it discusses. My goal is not to provide a
complete account of the rise and fall of western shame sanctions, nor even a
complete account of any one episode in this history. My (very different) goal
is to dredge the old literature for arguments that might be useful today-to
learn, as it were, from the experiences of the dead. This is not the way
professional history is usually written; maybe it is not the way history
ordinarily should be written. But history can surely be written this way
sometimes, and it seems peculiarly appropriate to write it this way here. We
are all sharply conscious that the reappearance of shame sanctions is the
reappearance of something very old, something for the understanding of which
living memory fails us. Perhaps, most of the time, there is not much point in
hunting for the wisdom of the past. In this case, however, we feel our lack of
living wisdom with peculiar acuteness.
I. MODERN SHAMING
It is important to begin by defining the topic with some care. We can sort
punishments into roughly five sorts of deprivations: deprivations of life
(execution); of liberty (imprisonment); of bodily safety and integrity (corporal
violence); of property (fines); and of what we might call "dignity" (shaming).
These classifications obviously overlap. In particular, every punishment can
involve some element of shaming. It may shame offenders, for example, to
send them to prison. Nevertheless, some punishments are more intended to
inflict shame than others. Many such punishments involve corporal violence.
Flogging, for example, has been regarded in many human societies as an
acutely shameful punishment. Branding, too-particularly branding in the
face-is a sanction that has carried intense shame in many societies.23
Mutilation sanctions, such as slitting the ear or nose, are also sanctions of
corporal violence with a heavy element of shaming. In addition, many societies
inflict posthumous shame, by mutilating or otherwise maltreating an offender's
corpse.24
23. See, e.g., YUVOON CHEN, PROBLEME DER STRAFE DER BRANDMARKUNG IM LICHTE VON
RECHTSVERGLEICHENDEN QUELLEN (1948); RuTH MELLINKOFF, THE MARK OF CAIN (1981); Adalbert
Erler, Brandmarken ins Antlitz, in RECHTSGESCHICHTE, RECHTSSPRACHE, RECHTSARCHAOLOGIE,
RECHTLICHE VOLKSKUNDE 115 (Ferdinand Elsener & W.H. Ruoff eds., 1965).
24. See, e.g., ALBERT ESSER, DIE EHRENSTRAFE 67 (1956); Stephen Robert Wilf, Anatomy and
Punishment in Late Eighteenth-Century New York, 22 J. Soc. HIsT. 507.515-16 (1989) (discussing punitive
dissection as a shame sanction in late 18th-century America). Shaming can have other posthumous effects,
too. In many societies, shameful deaths shame the offender's surviving family. See infra note 127.
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Nevertheless, it is not the case that all shame sanctions involve corporal
violence. In particular, some entail purer forms of humiliation. These sorts of
sanctions run a wide gamut. They include well-remembered seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century practices like the pillory and the stocks. They also include
less colorful sanctions, like "exposition," the nineteenth-century French practice
of standing a convicted offender before a crowd for an hour;25 public forced
labor that is intended to attract attention to convicts; 6 and admonitions and
forced public apologies. 27 It is these sorts of pure shame sanctions, which we
could also call "humiliation sanctions," that are reappearing, in new and
occasionally inventive forms, in American practice today. (American law also
displays a practice akin to humiliation sanctions in the form of laws like New
Jersey's "Megan's Law,"2' which requires public notification of the presence
in a community of certain released sex offenders. These are not pure
humiliation sanctions, though, and I will touch on them only glancingly.2'9)
These pure humiliation sanctions present a much tougher analytic problem than
do shame sanctions involving corporal violence. It is far easier to explain the
historical decline of shame sanctions involving corporal violence than it is to
explain the historical decline of sanctions involving pure public humiliation."
It is also far easier to say what is philosophically objectionable about sanctions
involving corporal violence than it is to say what is objectionable about pure
public humiliation.
Pure humiliation in fact poses a difficult policy puzzle. What is wrong
with chaining an offender to a pole in a public square for a few hours, if that
offender is not otherwise subjected to violence? What is wrong with making
an offender stand, or sit, outside the public courthouse, wearing a sign
describing his offense? What, in the least disconcerting case, is wrong with
publicizing the names of prostitutes' johns? And how, if at all, can we
distinguish these sorts of pure humiliation from other punishments that include
some element of shame? How can we say that pure humiliation sanctions are
wrong while still maintaining that imprisonment, which also shames to some
extent, is not wrong?
Many promoters of shame sanctions over the centuries have defended pure
humiliation sanctions. 3' The latest in this line of commentary is Professor
25. See CODE PtNAL PROGRESSIF: COMMENTAIRE SUR LA Lot MODIFCATp. E D CODE K%. "L 124-30
(Adolphe Chauveau ed., Paris, Bureau de la Junspmdence Cnminelle 1832) [hereinafter CODE PN.AL
PROGRESSIF].
26. See infra notes 78-80 (citing 18th-century thinkers who made such proposals)
27. For a typology of shame sanctions, see Kahan. supra note 16. at 631-34
28. Registration and Community Notification Laws. N.J. STAT AN%. §§ 2C 7-1 to -I I t\Vcst 1995
& Supp. 1997).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 140-141. 150-151
30. Indeed, the historians who have made the most important efforts to explain the decline of shame
sanctions-historians such as Michel Foucault and Pieier Spierenburg--ha e noticeably focused on corporal
violence. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME. SHAME AND RUNTEI'GRAT1ON (19891. John Braith%,aite &
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Kahan's unusually cogent essay.32 According to Kahan, there is nothing
wrong with pure humiliation sanctions-or at least nothing that is not equalled
or outweighed by the horrors and inconveniences of imprisonment. Indeed,
given the choice, he points out, offenders prefer shame to prison.33 What is
more, Kahan argues, shame sanctions probably do as good a job as
imprisonment at achieving most of the standard goals of punishment."4 Here
Kahan is joined by Toni Massaro, who, though a critic of shaming, concedes
that shame sanctions are fully compatible with standard punishment theory.
3 5
There is, these scholars observe, no empirical reason to suppose that shame
sanctions cannot deter; they seem beautifully retributive; they may well
rehabilitate better than prison does; and they might even serve to
incapacitate. 36 Most importantly, given the generally acknowledged failure of
imprisonment, Kahan argues, shame should be our alternative sanction of
choice; 37 unlike all other alternatives, shame sanctions do a particularly fine
job of satisfying our "expressive" needs, dramatizing society's condemnation
of the offense in a gratifying way.
38
How should we respond to such a defense of public humiliation?
In part, we might say that Professor Kahan's particular argument, with its
serene embrace of an "expressive" theory, is a bit surreal in this context.
Speaking of shame sanctions as "condemnation" does not do justice to our
intuitive sense of their peculiar kind of brutality and terror.39 But, even
leaving the expressive theory aside, defenses of shame sanctions give the
impression of somehow being strangely unacquainted with the traditions of
liberalism. Surely, one thinks, there must be something in the writings of
Stephen Mugford, Conditions of Successful Reintegration Ceremonies, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 139
(1994); sources cited infra note 80.
32. Kahan, supra note 16.
33. See id. at 641 n.204, 646.
34. See id. at 638-41 (discussing deterrence); id. at 644-46 (discussing reintegration); id. at 649
(discussing retribution).
35. See Massaro, supra note 13, at 1890-900.
36. See id. (arguing that shame sanctions are justifiable on all standard theories of punishment).
37. See Kahan, supra note 16, at 653.
38. Id.
39. Even accepting the propriety of using expressive punishment theory, it is important to recognize
that Professor Kahan has not really taken the full measure of the liberal expressive tradition. Kahan allows
himself to write as though imprisonment were intended to express simply the wrongness of the offense. Yet
the liberal tradition has always claimed something grander. The classic claim of the liberal tradition is not
simply that imprisonment expresses the "wrongness" of the offender's offense in positive law.
Imprisonment, in the classical liberal account, "expressively" reaffirms the value of liberty, a prevailing
social value different from anything expressed in positive law. See id. at 613. Professor Kahan knows this
liberal tradition, but I do not think he has taken the full measure of what it implies. The early 19th-century
liberal tradition always took the view that punishment does more than reaffirm, in a good thumping bloody
way, the illegality of what society regards as illegal. The liberal tradition always held that the system of
punishment functions, not by reaffirming that the offender has done wrong, but by excluding the offender
from participation in some larger social good. The problem with shame sanctions as alternative sanctions,
on this classical liberal line of argument, seems clear enough: Shame sanctions affirm the wrong underlying
social values.
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Immanuel Kant, or of John Stuart Mill, or of someone in the great liberal
tradition, that reveals why shame sanctions are wrong.
Well, there are classical liberal propositions that militate against the use
of shame sanctions. But the truth that I would like to begin facing in this
Essay is that those classical propositions bear little weight. Running down the
classical liberal attacks on shame sanctions turns out to be a disappointing
business.
Historically, the most powerful liberal argument against shame sanctions,
the one most extensively discussed in American legal literature, is the
argument from modernity, as it were: the argument that, in a modem,
anonymous, urban society, shame sanctions cannot possibly work. The
argument from modernity is a proposition with some old roots, running well
back into the eighteenth century.40 In its very widespread modem form, it has
assumed a place at the heart of sociological realism in the liberal tradition;
indeed, any number of sociologically informed commentators have embraced
it.41 The most recent advocate of the argument from modernity is Professor
Massaro, whose carefully argued 1991 article presents it in forceful fashion. 2
As these commentators point out, the face-to-face interaction that used to be
the stuff of village society (and that, in some sense, is perhaps still the stuff
of Japanese society) has collapsed in the modern, western world. Yet without
such face-to-face interaction, the argument runs, shame sanctions cannot work.
This follows from the very nature of shame itself, for shame is an emotion that
we feel in the presence of others who know us and know our misdeeds. Shame
is the loss of face in the eyes of neighbors who have the village habit of
condemning any kind of deviance and from whom one cannot escape. Yet the
essence of the anonymity of modern western city life is that one can always
escape. There is no point in shaming offenders who can instantly slip into the
back streets and who are likely, in any case, to move in an underworld
population that is very far from condemning the deviant. Indeed, at its worst,
shaming such characters may simply force them to renounce law-abiding
society entirely, moving into the underworld for good. 3
40. See, e.g., MATrHIAS CALONIUS, Dissenano Jundica de Delnquenttun ad Pubhcan Ignuonmntam
Expositione, in2 MATrHIAECALONII OPERA OMNIA 237. 237-38 (A I Ar%%idssoncd. PA Norstedt & Fi
1830) (1788).
41. See, e.g., HIRSCH, supra note 14. at 32-46
42. See Massaro, supra note 13.
43. See id. passim; Persons. supra note 10, at 1538-40: cf JOSEPH DOL'ARD BOrTARD. LEqO\S SLR
LES CODES PENAL ET D'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE 52-53. 56-57 (Pans. Libraine de Jurisprudence de
Cotillon 1851) (presenting a similar argument with respect to mid-19th-century France). BRArTwArrE.
supra note 31, at 59-60 (presenting a similar argument with respect to Continental Europe durng the
Middle Ages); [F.-M. VERMEIL]., ESSAI SUR LES RtFORMES A FAIRE DA"S NOTRE LeGistA'no% CRiMINE1E_
14 (Paris, Demonville 1781) (presenting a similar argument suth respect to pre-Revolution France)
Professor Massaro, in a more recent and as yet unpublished manuscript, argues that the sheer complexity
of the phenomenon of shame makes any hope of legal reform based on shame sanctions thin See Toni M.
Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform 88 (1997) (unpublished manuscript. on
file with the Yale Law Journal).
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Why doesn't this venerable argument resolve the question? It is founded
in some deep and well-established sociological arguments, and it has the great
merit of making apparent sense of a divide between western and nonwestern
legal cultures. The argument may seem at first glance to be our best route to
preserving an enlightened and informed liberalism.
Nevertheless, the argument from modernity, powerful though it may seem,
fails for a variety of reasons. In part, it fails for a reason to which I will
return: If our most pressing concern is the impact of shame sanctions on the
public, rather than their impact on the offender, then it is of no great
consequence to say that they fail to provoke shame in offenders." But, even
leaving that point aside, the argument from modernity is weaker than it seems
for two reasons. First, shame sanctions are in practice inflicted only on certain,
peculiarly vulnerable classes of offenders; and second, the psychology of
shame is arguably something different, and more complex, than the argument
from modernity supposes.
Let us begin with the particular classes of offenders upon whom shame
sanctions are visited in America. Though the point is often little discussed in
the literature, the fact is that shame sanctions are not now used (and have
never been used) for every type of offense. 5 On the contrary, shame
sanctions are typically applied to a fairly strictly delimited range of cases.
Broadly speaking, we can identify three classes of offenses typically penalized
through shame sanctions: (1) sexual and morals offenses; (2) commercial
offenses; and (3) first and minor offenses. It is not at all difficult to see why
shame sanctions have real impact in these three limited spheres.46
Beginning with sexual and morals offenses, it should come as no surprise
if persons charged with sexual offenses are psychologically vulnerable to
shame sanctions-no surprise, though not something that is entirely easy to
analyze either. We can all sense that someone charged with, for example,
patronizing prostitutes is likely to dread public exposure. The same is likely
true of someone charged with child molestation-though his is a psychology
of which we have a difficult time developing any kind of intuitive grasp.
Offenders of these kinds belong to a very old class of persons subject to shame
sanctions-persons such as adulterers (and conversely cuckolds), who were
historically among the most common targets of shame sanctions.47 They
44. See infra Part V.
45. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN 21 (1978) (discussing the use of shame
sanctions against homosexuals and shopkeepers). For an argument that the fine, rather than shaming, was
the predominant sanction in colonial New York, see JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 709-10 (1944). See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 38
(discussing the use of shame sanctions in colonial law).
46. The limited range of offenses for which shame sanctions can be used was implicitly acknowledged
by the New York Times in its editorial endorsing the use of such sanctions. See Alternative Sentencing,
supra note 19. It is odd that journalists should notice what scholars seem slow to see.
47. See the treatments of the famous humiliation right called the "charivart" in HENRI REY-FLAUD,
LE CHARIVARI: LES RITUELS FONDAMENTAUX DE LA SEXUALITT (1985); and LE CHARIVARI (Jacques Le
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belong to the class of sex offenders, and there is nothing that should surprise
us in the fact that this class is vulnerable to shame sanctions, once we
acknowledge that shame includes a sexual component. Exactly what that sexual
component might be is a matter of dispute among psychologists and
philosophers.48 (This is a tough question to which I will return.) "9 But
whatever our ultimate analysis of the sex-shame nexus may be, it is
indisputable that offenders will often be peculiarly susceptible to shaming
when they are charged with a sexual (or, perhaps more broadly, a "morals")
offense. Shame, particularly in a Christian or post-Christian society, always
shadows us in our sexual activities. Even solitary sexual activity can be
accompanied by shame.50 There is, therefore, no reason to think that sexual
offenders will feel shame only when confronted by familiar neighborly faces.
On the contrary, there is much reason to think such offenders will suffer a hard
psychic blow regardless of the social setting in which they are exposed. The
fact that one's sexual activities have been exposed has a way of lodging itself
inescapably in one's consciousness.
Indeed, the case of the sexual offender begins to reveal to us a truth to
which I will return repeatedly, a truth that tends to undermine the argument
from modernity: namely that it is wrong to think of shame solely as public
shame, solely as an emotion triggered by the gaze of others. Shame, as recent
Goff & Jean-Claude Schmitt eds., 1981). The charivart was a common ntual of mockery, often descending
into violence, most frequently (but not exclusively) directed at older women sho marncd younger men
The varieties of the charivari as "itual[s] of popular justice" are also discussed in PET-tM- Bt RKF. POP. LAR
CULTURE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 198-99 (Harper & Row 1978) (1978): IGNATIEFIF. supra note 45. at
40; and sources cited in id.
48. For a discussion of the sexual content of shame in the Freudian tradition. see GE.RHART PIERS &
MILTON B. SINGER, SHAME AND GUILT 18-19 (1971); for an effort to distinguish shame from "scxual
guilt," see id. at 22-23; for a discussion of the relative neglect of shame in that tradition. see ERIK H
ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 252 (2d ed. 1963): and for a sursey of the neglect generally. see
GERSHEN KAUFMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SHAME 3-4. 7-11 (Routledge 1993) (1989) For an effort to
distinguish inferiority shame from sexual shame, see J. GOLDBERG. LA CULPAaILITE. AXIOItI DE LA
PSYCHANALYSE (1985). For an argument that sexual excitement is associated with the experience of shame.
see MARCO WALTER BATACCHI & OLGA CODISPOTI. LA VERGOGNA- SAGGIO DI PSICOLOGIA DI\AIICA
E CLINICA 27-28 (1992); and sources cited in id. See also Donald L. Nathanson. A Tmetable for Shame,
in MANY FACES OF SHAME 1, 39-45 (Donald L. Nathanson ed.. 1987) (discussing esdcnce linking the
development of shame with that of genitality). Freud claimed that the exposure of the genitals %%as the root
of shame. See SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DIsCONTE.NTs (1930), reprinted in 21 THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 57, 99 n I tJames
Strachey et al. trans., 1961). For a more recent treatment growing out of the ps)choanal) tic tradition. see
LEON WURMSER, THE MASK OF SHAME 174-93 (1981).
As the survey in Kaufman's work suggests, the weight of the arguments of ps)chologists ma, v.cll
be against any emphasis on sex. See KAUFMAN, supra. at 7-11 (treating sexual sources of shame as only
one type among many). For a recent effort at explanation placing little or no %%eight on sex. see RIIARD
S. LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION 243-44 (1991). 1 take it. hossever. that csen psychologists ssho
see no deep sexual content in shame would not deny that much of the experience of shame ins olsei. sexual
thoughts and activities. For philosophically oriented treatments laying more scight on sex and. more
broadly, on bodily functions, see MAX SCHELER, Ober Scham und Schamngefuitl. in I SCIIIFTE% ALS DE.M
NACHLASS 65, 69-77 (Maria Scheler ed.. 1954). which discusses bodily shame, and CARL D SCIINEIDER.
SHAME, EXPOSURE AND PRIVACY (1977).
49. See infra notes 108-115 and accompanying text.
50. This point is emphasized in SCHELER. supra note 48. at 78
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philosophical and psychological commentators have insisted, can also be
triggered by the sound of an inner voice or the gaze of an inner eye." Even
when alone, we are capable of feeling that our sense of self has been
permanently damaged because we were exposed somewhere, sometime. This
is perhaps peculiarly true of sexual shame, for we are quite capable of feeling
sexual shame without ever being witnessed; but, as Bernard Williams has
argued, the same is also true of other sorts of shame.5 2 The argument from
modernity rests on a questionable notion of shame, one that reduces it too
casually to an emotion experienced only when we are under the direct gaze of
others.
If the argument from modernity seems to carry little weight in the realm
of sexual offenses, the case is no different with respect to the other spheres in
which shame sanctions are typically applied: the spheres of commercial and of
minor or first offenses. With respect to the first of these, shame sanctions have
a long history of being applied to commercial offenders. For example, in the
medieval and early-modem world, a range of garish and brutal forms of public
pillorization was visited upon bankrupts, who were often required to bang their
bare buttocks against rocks in public.5 3 Similar treatment was administered
to other sorts of commercial offenders. 4 Nor is commercial shaming limited
to premodern history (or to contemporary China). America uses it too. As the
New York Times is certainly right to point out, one of the watershed
developments in the reemergence of shame in the United States involved the
sphere of commerce: Then-U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani's decision to make
humiliating public arrests of Wall Street brokers marked a leap toward a new
use of prosecutorial power.55
Should we expect such commercial shaming to work? We should indeed,
partly for a reason that suggests itself immediately: Merchants and participants
in the world of business inevitably fear loss of reputation, for a variety of legal
and sociological reasons, and with particular intensity. For practical purposes,
51. See, e.g., June Price Tangney et al., Are Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment Distinct Emotions?.
70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1256, 1256 (1996) ("Contrary to popular belief, shame [is] no more
likely than guilt to be experienced in 'public' situations; ... [both] emotions typically occurred in social
contexts, but a significant proportion of shame and guilt events occurred when respondents were alone.").
52. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY 82 (1993).
53. See James Q. Whitman, The Moral Menace of Roman Law and the Making of Commerce: Some
Dutch Evidence, 105 YALE L.J. 1841, 1871-78 (1996).
54. See, e.g., IGNATIEFF, supra note 45, at 21 (describing the treatment of shopkeepers); cf. BURKE,
supra note 47, at 160-61 (describing popular hostility toward businessmen in early-modem Europe).
Something of the same spirit can perhaps be seen in sentences that seek to "shame" corporations. See
Andrew Cowan, Note, Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punishment by Publicity Under the New
Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2387 (1992). Corporations, of course, cannot experience the
emotion of shame; shame sanctions directed against them would nevertheless be objectionable on the
criteria I articulate below. See infra Part V.
55. See Jan Hoffman, Crime and Punishment: Shame Gains Popularity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1997,
at Al; cf Scot J. Paltrow, The Drexel Agreement To Settle; The Prosecutor; Giuliani Has Fans, Foes in
War on White-Collar Crime, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1988, § 4, at I (discussing the mixed response to
Giuliani's tactics).
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the world of commerce is not an anonymous world. 6 This is a point known
well enough, and made often enough, in the literature of commercial law 7
that it should not need a lot of emphasis. But shamed merchants are likely to
suffer harms from shame sanctions that go beyond the conventional loss of
commercial reputation. It may be that merchants value their reputations not
only for reasons of economic self-interest, but also because they have an
attachment to a kind of bourgeois respectability that shame sanctions peculiarly
threaten. This is undoubtedly not as true today as it was in the nineteenth
century, or even in the 1930s or 1950s, but it is obviously still true to some
extent. Public humiliation is, surely, still especially painful for many
"respectable" businessfolk.5" There is thus plenty of reason to believe that
commercial shaming can be effective.
What, then, about the category of first and minor offenders? These may
well be persons whose offenses have no taint of sex and whose sensibilities are
thoroughly unbourgeois. Can we safely assume that shame sanctions would
have no impact on these offenders? I do not think we can assume any such
thing-though the reasons here have less to do with the psychology of shame
than with the anthropology of status in our society. I suggest that we make,
sometimes consciously, sometimes not, a sharp status distinction between
respectable and criminal segments of the population. First and minor
offenders-persons such as shoplifters or drunk drivers-are persons whom we
regard as unable to grasp this sharp distinction, as unable to sense how
disreputable it is to engage in crime;59 they are persons whom we regard as
somehow not "really" belonging to the status group of criminals, even though
they have engaged in criminal behavior. When officials inflict a shame
sanction on a person in this category-circulating a shoplifter's photograph
after his detention,' for example, or requiring a drunk driver to wear a pink
bracelet reading "D.U.I. CONVICT" 6"-they notify him, in effect, that he is
edging toward true disreputability. We may think of shame sanctions in this
context as liminal rites, rites that warn first and minor offenders that they are
56. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law. Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REv. 691, 693-95 (1986) (describing the value of reputation for ,ndi' iduals %%,ho
engage in marketplace relations).
57. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relattotships. 104 HARv L REV 375. 393
& n.64 (1990); see also Seth F. Kreimer. Sunlight. Secrets. and Scarlet Letters Tihe Tension Beteen
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law. 140 U. PA. L. REV I. 51-54 (1991) (decnbing the social
stigma created by government disclosures).
58. Cf Kahan, supra note 16, at 643 (describing potential disgrace as part of the calculus of an
executive considering illegal behavior). I would also note that deeper mysteries may he here. too At least
in European history, commercial shame and sexual shame have had a long. deep. and puzzling connection.
one that arguably goes back all the way to Paul's first Epistle to the Thessalonians. shich seemed to many
readers to equate commercial and sexual sinning. See Whitman. supra note 53. at 1859 & n 62 (discussing
I Thess. 4:3-8).
59. Drunk drivers are very common targets of modem American shame sanction, See Mas aro. supra
note 13, at 1886-87.
60. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695 (1976).
61. See Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793. 794 (Ga. Ct App 1993)
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flirting with a deep, and deeply undesirable, status change. There is good
reason to expect that such shame sanctions will have a real psychic impact, for
rites of this kind are powerful things.62 Though our sense of status may be
dark and inarticulate, it is psychologically strong. Warning people that they are
brushing up against outcast status is therefore likely to have an impact on at
least some of them.63
There is no point in exaggerating the power of these observations. It is
undoubtedly the case that some sex offenders, some merchants, some
shoplifters, and some drunk drivers will laugh off attempts at public
humiliation.64 But it is implausible to think that all, or even most, of them
will. Once we reflect on what shame is, and when shame sanctions are applied,
the argument from modernity seems a slim thread from which to hang our
opposition to shame sanctions. Shame sanctions are likely to work in the ways
in which they are applied, even in a modern, western, urban society, for they
are, in practice, only inflicted in certain dark corners of our social world. That
shame sanctions should work is no more than what we might expect from the
simple fact that courts impose them. Courts do so because they think, with
good reason, that shame sanctions will have a real effect.
II. FORMS OF SOCIAL INDIGNITY
We must begin our reasoning, then, from the assumption that shame
sanctions, as applied, are in fact likely to work. We must also narrow our
inquiry somewhat. The question is not, "What is wrong with shame sanctions
as such?" The real question is, "What is wrong with shame sanctions as we
apply them?" If a government engages in shaming in a few, shadowy corners
of social life, what is it doing that is improper?
Our first intuitive response may be to say that any such government is
violating a venerable liberal prohibition on cruelty. This is something we might
say even while recognizing that modern American shame sanctions do not
involve corporal violence. The cruelty of shame sanctions, it might be said,
involves something other than inflicting physical pain on offenders. In
particular, we might argue that regardless of how scrupulously shame sanctions
leave the body of the offender intact, they violate the offender's dignity in
62. See ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RiTEs OF PASSAGE 39-40 (Monika B. Vizedom & Gabrielle L.
Caffee trans., University of Chicago Press 1960) (1908) (describing rites of separation from, and integration
into, groups).
63. Shame sanctions in this context can also be thought of, incidentally, as addressed to society at
large. By marking first and minor offenders as persons edging close to the borderlands of forbidden
conduct, we mark for everyone the dangerous point at which one might cross over from the law-abiding
to the criminal class.
64. In addition, it is worth noting that these classes overlap to some extent. Drunk drivers are, of
course, also morals offenders of a kind (leaving aside the hard question of how "morals" offenses relate
to sexual ones). Shoplifting is, of course, also a violation of commercial morality.
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some objectionable way-that they run contrary to some deep norm requiring
us to treat even criminals with respect. The government, we would say,
properly has the power to deprive offenders only of property or liberty, but
never of dignity.
This argument certainly has a kind of intuitive rightness to it. But it is
obviously inadequate as an account of what is wrong with shame sanctions,
unless and until it is fortified by some account of what "dignity" is.65 Toward
the end of this Essay I try to develop a concept of "dignity" that may suit our
needs, 66 but for the moment I would like to stick with my program of
reviewing the legacy of the classical liberal tradition. What is it that violates
principles of liberalism in presenting an offender to the eyes of the public? Can
we find a concept of "dignity" in the social views of the classical liberal
tradition that will satisfy us?
The answer, once again, is disappointing. Here too, the classical liberal
tradition leaves us disappointingly devoid of answers, or at least of answers
that have any clear relevance to the society in which we live now. To make
this point, I would like now to turn to history, to the great era of reformist
debate over shame sanctions, the period from roughly 1750 to 1850.67 This
is the period when our liberal tradition was formed, at least with respect to
shame sanctions. It is during this period, we would hope, that persuasive
dignitary arguments against shame sanctions might be found.
And when we investigate what we might broadly call the social reformers
of this period, we do indeed discover some more or less dignitary arguments.
In particular, we can identify two separate reformist campaigns of relevance:
a campaign for status revolution, which began, roughly speaking, in the mid-
eighteenth century; and a campaign for moral revolution, which began in the
Victorian era, roughly around the second quarter of the nineteenth century. In
the first and more easily understood of these, reformers attacked shame
sanctions for promoting a spirit of social hierarchy. In the second and much
more mysterious campaign, the reformers attacked shame sanctions for
promoting public indecency or a surrender to our animal nature.
Let us begin with the first. As reformers from the mid-eighteenth century
onward were well aware, early-modem shame sanctions frequently operated by
65. Massaro is a notable example of an author who is inclined to condemn shaming as a violation of
dignity but who finds it difficult to specify exactly the sort of "dignity" involhed. See Mas.,saro. supra note
13, at 1942-43.
66. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCiPUNE AND PuNtSII: TilE BIR~m OF "tE PRISO% passim (Alan
Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975); IGNATIEFF. siupra note 45. passim The roots of modem.
occidental opposition to shame sanctions seem to reach well back into the 16th and 17th centunes. See,
e.g., JULIUS CLARUS, RECEPTARUM SENTENTMARUM OPERA OMNIA 335 (Frankfurt am Main. Ex Officina
Typogmphica Nicolai Bassaei 1596) (noting the decline of public punishment for clerics in late 16th-
century Italy); 2 JOHN SELDEN, DE SYNEDRIIS & PRAEFECT.RIS IURIDICIS VETERL+% EaRAEORL't 566
(London, Typis Jacobi Flesher 1653) (objecting to the practice of public flogging) Pursuing this early
history, however, is beyond the bounds of this Essay
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symbolically lowering the offender's standing in the established social
hierarchy.68 This symbolic lowering of status was made possible by the fact
that, by very longstanding tradition in the premodern world, different
punishments were used for different social status groups. The most famous of
these differences pertained, of course, to capital punishment: Members of the
nobility were beheaded, while commoners were hanged. 69 It was accordingly
status-degrading to hang a nobleman and status-enhancing to decapitate a
commoner.70 (It was for this reason that the guillotine was considered a
"revolutionary" device-it extended the benefit of decapitation to a large, and
formerly deprived, segment of French society.)
But the status distinctions embedded in punishments were by no means
limited to forms of capital punishment. Most shame sanctions, for example,
were low-status punishments. Subjecting an offender to shame sanctions-
particularly to sanctions such as flogging, but also to mere public
exposure-amounted to treating the offender as a member of a low social
order. The "dignity" of which shame sanctions robbed the offender was thus,
in part, "dignity" in a narrow, technical, premodern sense: The infliction of a
shame sanction robbed the offender of any claim to an honored place in an
articulated social hierarchy of deference.7t
It should be clear enough why this status-heavy character of early-modern
shame sanctions stirred social reformist zealotry. Shame sanctions belonged to
the great baroque structure of social hierarchy that revolutionaries of the later
eighteenth century were most eager to dismantle.72 The attack on shame
sanctions thus partook of the same spirit that led to the introduction of the
guillotine and the abolition of sumptuary laws: It was an attack on status
distinctions, on the very idea that there should be high-class and low-class
punishments.73 Liberal thinkers of the turn of the eighteenth century and after,
such as Benjamin Rush and Wilhelm von Humboldt, put a subtle theoretical
gloss on this campaign. As they argued it, a society's form of punishment
should reflect that society's sense of its highest good.74 In a society whose
68. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 16, at 611-12.
69. See MUYART DE VOUGLANS, LES LOIX CRIMINELLES DE LA FRANCE, DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL
833 (Paris, Morin 1780).
70. See id. (explaining that decapitation does not dishonor an executed person).
71. For an enlightened defense of status distinctions in shame penalties, see VERMEIL, supra note 43,
at 115-16. It was this aspect of early-modem shame sanctions that stimulated Gustav Radbruch's famous
hypothesis about the historical evolution of criminal law: The evolution of criminal law, he argued, had
involved the gradual extension of punishments first used for the lowest orders of societies to higher and
higher orders. See GUSTAV RADBRUCH, ELEGANTIAE JURIS CRIMINALIS 5 (2d ed. 1950).
72. For an attack on shame sanctions in light of this tradition dating to the French Revolution, see P.C.
NIOCHE, MOTION AVEC PROJET DE Lot SUR LE DUEL, ET SUR LES INJURES ET VOLES DE FAIT ENTRE
CITOYENS 55-57 (Paris, P. Provost 1791).
73. For a description of this reasoning in the 19th century, see, for example, MYRA C. GLENN,
CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: PRISONERS, SAILORS, WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA III (1984).
74. See WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT, THE LIMITS OF STATE ACTION 112 (J.W. Burrow ed., Liberty
Fund 1993) (1792); BENJAMIN RUSH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC PUNISHMENTS UPON
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highest good was liberty, the proper punishment should accordingly be
deprivation of liberty. Only in a preliberal society that regarded social status
as the highest good should the form of punishment involve deprivation of
social status, of dignity.
These were elegant arguments. But, as Professor Kahan is surely right in
observing,75 these arguments make clear how little bearing the classical liberal
situation has upon our own. The fact is that our society no longer possesses
nicely articulated status distinctions. We do not have "'dignities" of the
premodern kind. In particular, our society no longer attaches different status
meanings to different punishments; or, at least, if it does, those status meanings
do not attach to shame sanctions as such. 76 This is not to say that the
punishments we inflict lack status meaning completely; as I have suggested,
shame sanctions may be used precisely for offenders who have not yet sunk
fully to criminal status.77 But it is no longer the case that when we inflict
shame punishments we symbolically depress the offender's standing in a
legally defined social hierarchy; we have none of the old sense that a person
once subjected to public shaming has become socially untouchable. While we
may remain sympathetic to the revolutionary drive toward status equality, we
can no longer have any sense of how eliminating shame sanctions might
contribute to that drive.
The drive toward status equality, however, was not the only classical
liberal impulse toward dignitary social reform. In fact, it was not amidst the
drive toward status equality that shame sanctions were ultimately abolished.
This point deserves some emphasis since many of us imagine that shame
sanctions were eliminated in the course of the eighteenth century. Yet it is by
no means the case that every figure of the ages of Enlightenment and
Revolution thought that shame sanctions were a bad thing. Cesare Beccaria
7
1
and Jeremy Bentham,79 most notably, but other Enlightenment figures as
CRIMINALS AND UPON SOCIETY 19 (photo. reprint. n.d.) (1787)
75. See Kahan, supra note 16, at 611-16.
76. On the contrary, to the extent that I am right in m) analysis of shame sanctions as applied to fit
and minor offenders, i.e., persons who have not acquired criminal status. see supra notes 59-63 and
accompanying text, we must say that American shame sanctions are no%% punishment!. used typically for
upper-status offenders. But cf. Carol S. Steiker. Punishment and Procedure. Punishment Theors and the
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 797 n. 120 (1997) (attacking Kahan on the ground that
shaming will have a harsher impact on minorities and other disadsantaged persons). I am not persuaded
by Professor Steiker's argument: Shame sanctions seem. if anything, to be alternative sanctions for
privileged persons who would otherwise be incarcerated
77. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text
78. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PL NISIMENITS AND OTHIER WRITINGS 54-55 (Richard
Bellamy ed. & Richard Davies et al. trans., Cambridge Ums. Press 1995) (1765). see also EBERHARD WETS,
CESARE BECCARIA (1738-1794), MAILANDER AL'FKLARER L ND AREGER DER STRAFRECHTSREORtEN IN
EUROPA 15 (1992) (describing Beccana's argument for public forced labor).
79. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGIsLATtON 347-50 (C.K. Ogden ed, Fred B Rothman
& Co. 1987) (1931) (proposing a variety of shame sanctions to replace the pillory)
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well,80 thought of shame sanctions as an indispensable punishment device.
Indeed, despite some partial abolitions in the French and American
Revolutions, shame sanctions survived into the post-Napoleonic era.8'
The practice of public humiliation, in fact, was decisively ended only
toward the middle of the nineteenth century.82 By that time, reformers no
longer emphasized status dignity, at least not to the extent that they had in the
eighteenth century.83 The reformers who succeeded in eliminating shame
80. See, e.g., [WILLIAM EDEN AUCKLAND], PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 57, 59 (London, B. White &
T. Cadell 2d ed. 1771) (opposing branding, mutilation, and other punishments that "fix a lasting, visible
stigma upon the offender," but nonetheless supporting "the stamp of ignominy" as the "best instrument for
the promotion of morality, and the extirpation of vice"); HENRY FIELDING, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES
OF THE LATE INCREASE OF ROBBERS, &C. (London, A. Millar 175 1) (condemning various aspects of public
executions but concluding that they ought to be "solemn" and "in some degree private," with an eye to
impressing the imagination of the crowd more vividly), reprinted in 13 HENRY FIELDING, THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF HENRY FIELDING 5, 122-25 (Croscup & Sterling Co. 1902) (1793); INSTRUCTION DONNIE PAR
CATHERINE II IMPItRATRICE Er LGISLATRICE DE TOUTES LES RUsSIES, A LA COMMISSION ]TABLIE PAR
CETrE SOUVERAINE, POUR TRAVAILLER A LA RIDACTION D'UN NouvEAu CODE DES LoIx 91 217
(Lausanne, Chez Francois Grasset & Co. 2d ed. 1769) (ordering the avoidance of sanctions involving
corporal violence but the application of shame sanctions with regard to "enthusiasts, those who pretend to
some divine inspiration, those who wish to pass for saints" (translation by author)); LACRETELLE, DISCOURS
SUR LE PR.IUGt DES PEINES INFAMANTES 363 (Paris, Chez Cuchet 1784) (stating that the object is to make
the use of shame sanctions "more wise, more varied, more frequent" (translation by author)); J.H. DE
ROUSSEL DE LA BERARDIIRE, DISSERTATIONS SUR LA COMPOSITION DES LOIX CRIMINELLES 33-34 (Leiden,
Heyligert & Hoogstraten 1775) (praising Beccaria and proposing that convicts be subjected to "the most
vile and painful public labor" before the eyes of the community (translation by author)). For the same kind
of argument in the early 18th century, see CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS, DE EXISTIMATIONE, FAMA, ET INFAMIA
EXTRA REM PUBLICAM (n.p., 1709), reprinted in 3 DISSERTATIONUM ACADEMICARUM VARII INPRIMIS
IURIDICI ARGUMENTI 239, 258 (Halle, Impensis loannis lacobi Gebaveri 1777) (hereinafter
DISSERTATIONES]. Thomasius asserts the value of shame sanctions but concedes that flogging "as we
practice it today ... does not seem completely rational." Id. (translation by author); see also CHRISTIAN
THOMASIUS, AN POENAE VIVENTIUM, EOS INFAMANTES, SINT ABSURDAE ET ABROGANDAE? (Thomasius,
Praeses, Johann Heinrich de Kalm, Respondent) (n.p., 1723) [hereinafter THOMASIUS, AN POENAE
VIVENTIUM] (quoting a statute of King George I for Hanover, dated December 28, 1717, which commuted
public whipping and the like into a sentence of forced public labor), reprinted in 4 DISSERTATIONES, supra,
at 539, 576-77 (1780).
81. To catch the mood of declining revolutionary fervor leading into the 19th-century practice in
France, see [TARGET], PROJET DU CODE CRIMINEL, CORRECTIONEL ET DE POLICE at xviii (n.p., 1802),
which explains the necessity of retaining the practice of branding. For vivid early 19th-century descriptions,
see, for example, I M.B. SAINT-EDME, DICTONNAIRE DE LA PINALITt DANS TOUTES LES PARTIES DU
MONDE CONNU 37-39 (Paris, Plassan 1824), which describes English attainder; 3 id. at 156-60 (1825),
which describes the French carcan; id. at 180-81, which describes the Scottish cavalcade; id. at 338-50,
which describes the degradation from rights; and 4 id. at 84-87 (1828), which describes branding.
82. See BOITARD, supra note 43, at 56-57 (describing mid-century French reforms); ESSER, supra note
24, at 71-72 (explaining that in Germany public humiliation as punishment generally fell out of use in the
mid-19th century but that, in certain respects, its use continued into the 1930s); 4 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 343-53 (1948) (describing
public executions in Great Britain); I JAMES FITZJAMS STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 489-90 (London, MacMillan 1883) (describing punishments for misdemeanors in Great Britain);
PAUL DE WIN, DE KAAKSTRAF IN BELGIP VAN DE FRANSE TIJD TOT 1867 passim (1992) (tracing early
19th-century reforms); see also Simon Coldham, Crime and Punishment in British Colonial Africa, in 4
LA PEINE, supra note 3, at 57, 61 (noting the survival of public execution in British colonial Africa into
the 1930s).
83. The status-based argument certainly survived in the 19th century, especially in Germany, where
it was framed in the typical language of historical analysis of Roman and Germanic law. See, e.g.,
THEODOR MAREZOLL, DAS GEMEINE DEUTSCHE CRIMINALRECHT 151-55 (Leipzig, Verlag von Joh.
Ambrosius Barth 1847). German traditions of debate, it should be noted, were substantially different from
19th-century western traditions. I do not, however, discuss the German traditions further in this Essay.
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sanctions were not the status revolutionaries of the eighteenth century but the
moral revolutionaries of what we may call, extending an Anglo-American term
to the larger West, the Victorian era. These successful Victorian-era reformers
spoke of "human dignity" in a grander, more vague, and more mysterious way.
The abolition of shame sanctions in the Victorian era presents, in fact,
some difficult interpretive problems. Some of the Victorian opposition to
shame sanctions clearly grew out of distaste for punishments involving
corporal violence. Indeed, historians who have tried to explain the Victorian
abolition, like Michel Foucault," Pieter Spierenburg, and Myra Glenn,
s6
have focused very heavily on the emergence of this distaste for corporal
violence. But not all nineteenth-century shame sanctions involved corporal
violence. On the contrary, many nineteenth-century shame sanctions involved
the pure public display of the offender, and much nineteenth-century reformist
energy was directed against such practices. It is the nineteenth-century
campaign against pure public display of the offender that should interest us
most today since current American shame sanctions do not involve corporal
violence. Yet it is precisely this campaign that we understand least. Historians
of punishment have focused much too narrowly on corporal violence.
Nevertheless, with some effort at interpretation, we can understand the
Victorian attack on shame sanctions. What nineteenth-century reformers tended
to say was that public display of the offender was "indecent," or "brutalizing,"
or that it reduced humans somehow to "animals." What did they mean by this?
Unfortunately, they rarely made their point in any sort of clear analytic way., 7
Take, for example, a passage written by de Molknes, a leading French reformer
whose book On Humane Values in Criminal Law s appeared just before the
Revolution of 1830, which largely ended shaming practices in France. Molines
confronted a regime of French shame sanctions that included two principal
practices: the narque, a kind of branding done on the shoulder of the offender,
and the carcan, a cousin of the pillory, which entailed chaining an offender by
84. See FOUCAULT, supra note 67. I do not mean to question Foucault's admirably %,dc learning or
to deny the subtlety of many of his observations about pure display of the offender See. e.g. td. at 106-17
I mean only to say that the primary focus of Foucault's famous argument is the shift from penalizing the
body to penalizing the soul-a shift described by Foucault principally %stth reference to corporal %.iolencc
See, e.g., id. at 130-31.
85. See PIETER SPIERENBURG, THE SPECTACLE OF S-tF-ERI.G 183-99 (1984) (descnbing the sc of
a new sensibility with regard to suffering); Pieter Spicrenburg. The B d and the State Eart Modern
Europe, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 49 (Norval Mors & David J Rothman Cds. 1995)
86. See GLENN, supra note 73. For thoughtful discussions of the problem, see, for example. FRIEDMAN.
supra note 7, at 74-82; and DAVID GARLAND. PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY A S-1 DY IN SOCIAL
THEORY 229-47 (1990). Garland still focuses largely on corporal violence and on the 18th century See id
87. Moreover, when this Victorian argument is occasionally repeated today. it tends to mystify us
Thus, Kahan finds it difficult to grasp why Norval Morms and Michael Tonry should regard corporal
punishment, in classically Victorian terms, as "brutalizing" to both the offender and the public See Kahan.
supra note 16, at 610 (discussing NORVAL MORRIS & MtCIIAEL TONRY. BETWEE.N PRISON AD
PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENT"S IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTrE.M 6 (1990))
88. DE MOLENES. DE L'HUMANITt DANS LES Lois CRIMINELLI-S (Pans, Fhlix Locqum 1830)
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an iron neck-collar to a post and exposing him to the public.89 Mol6nes
attacked the marque by denouncing its violative way of handling the human
body: It was barbaric, Mol~nes wrote, in an emotion-laden appeal to the
modem sensibility, to apply "a red iron to the human skin." 90 But to Mol6nes,
the barbarism of branding went beyond the fact that it involved corporal
violence; it was barbaric as well, he argued, because branding "assimilates
humans to animals."9' This was a version of the common belief that I want
to pursue: the belief that shame sanctions "brutalized." But what exactly did
Mol~nes mean by this belief? He did not say. It is not self-evident that
branding is something more properly done to animals than to humans.
Mol~nes's argument that the carcan violated "human dignity," brutalizing both
the offender and the crowd that watched, was no more clearly articulated:
It is a scandalous tableau ....
It degrades the human race to deliver it to the gaze of the people
in this state of abasement.-Let us renounce this punishment, which
is condemned by the values of humanity, which accustoms the
populace to tread pity underfoot, which teaches it how one remains
brazen in the face of shame, and which makes it forget all sentiments
of human dignity.
92
What did Mol~nes conceive the "sentiments of human dignity" to be? Why did
he (and others of his day)93 think that the mere display of the offender
"abase[d]" him? He did not say.94
Later Victorian authors spoke of the "brutalization" involved in shame
sanctions as something that raised, in some vague way, issues of public
immorality. William Graham Sumner's 1906 Folkways,95 for example, treated
the end of public punishment as part of a much grander nineteenth-century
evolution toward public "seemliness" and "decency":
89. See 3 SAINT-EDME, supra note 81, at 156-60.
90. MOL'NES, supra note 88, at 393 (translation by author).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 401.
93. The Code Penal Progessif, for example, quotes the formal government justification for abolition
of the carcan:
[Tihis punishment degrades the condemned person in his own eyes: He may, before he has been
exposed to the public, have retained some feelings of shame; he loses those feelings when he
is forced to confront the catcalls of the populace, and the sentiment of his infamy deprives him
of the possibility, as of the desire, to regain the esteem of his fellow citizens. As for the public,
this punishment, which frightens them, may also deprave them: It extinguishes in them the
feelings of charity and pity; it familiarizes them with the sight of infamy.
CODE PtNAL PROGESSIF, supra note 25, at 125 (translation by author).
94. We find the same sort of silence, about something that apparently seemed too obvious for
explanation, in the account of the history of French penal practice by the leading prison reformer Bdrenger.
See I BtRENGER, DE LA RtPRESSION PtNALE, DE SES FORMES ET DE SES EFFETS 218 (Paris, lmprimeric
et Librarie Gdn~rale de Jurisprudence 1855) (noting the suppression of public exposition after 1848 but
uncharacteristically neglecting to explain the change).
95. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (Ayer Co. 1940) (1906).
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In the Middle Ages very great attention was given to seemliness in
the private conduct of individuals .... Public life, however, was
characterized by great unseemliness .. . .In the fifteenth century a
rage for indecent conduct arose .... Rudeness of manners in eating,
dancing, etc., was cultivated as a pose.... Torture, persecution,
violent measures, would all have been impossible if there had been a
sense of seemliness. The punishments, executions, and public
amusements grossly outraged any human and civilized taste."
The end of public punishment was thus, according to Sumner, part of the rise
of "human and civilized taste," part of a larger rise to "decency" in the
nineteenth-century public sphere generally. It is, indeed, worth quoting Sumner
a bit more extensively to get a fuller sense of his late-Victorian sensibilities of
"decency." Sumner's western world was a place whose standards of public
behavior had been transformed within living memory:
Decency has to do with the covering of the body and with
concealment of bodily functions. Modesty is reserve of behavior and
sentiment.... Propriety is the sum of all the prescriptions in the
mores as to right and proper behavior .... Within a generation the
public latrines in the cities of continental Europe have been made far
more secluded and private than they formerly were. Within ten years
there has been a great change of standard as to the propriety of
spitting.97
What exactly did Sumner imagine "public decency" to be? What was it, to his
Victorian eye, that made the abolition of the "medieval" practice of public
punishment akin to the elimination of spitting and the "concealment of bodily
functions"? He hardly explained. Sumner, like Mol~nes, spoke from
nineteenth-century assumptions too deep to be articulated.
It can be frustrating, in short, to read nineteenth-century authors-they
seem to speak of something that matters a great deal, but they do not explain
themselves well at all. Nevertheless, there were authors who provided a more
articulate picture of nineteenth-century attitudes, especially with respect to the
"brutalizing" effect of public punishment on the watching crowd. To Sumner's
British contemporary L.T. Hobhouse, for example, writing in Morals in
Evolution,98 it came down to a question of psychology:
[T]he old rigour, so far as it rested on reason at all, was based on a
very crude psychology. People are not deterred from murder by the
sight of the murderer dangling from a gibbet. On the contrary, what
there is in them of lust for blood is tickled and excited, their
96. Id. at 469-70.
97. Id. at 420-21.
98. L.T. HOBHOUSE. MORALS IN EVOLLrION (2d rcv ed. 1908)
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sensuality or ferocity is aroused, and the counteracting impulses, the
aversion to bloodshed, the compunction for suffering, are arrested.99
To Hobhouse, public punishment was a bad idea because it stirred up certain
base instincts of "sensuality [and] ferocity." The problem raised by public
punishment, as he saw it, was part of the great overarching problem of moral
psychology: how human beings learned to master their animal instincts."
William Thackeray spoke in much the same frame of mind when in 1840
he described himself as feeling "ashamed and degraded at the brutal curiosity"
that had drawn him to a public execution. 0'° Similarly, Francis Wayland,
President of Brown University and author of the mid-century The Elements of
Moral Science, °2 argued that public discussion of another's crimes, if done
"with pleasure or with a desire of injury," was sinful.'0 3 Indeed it was
"injurious" to the character of the speaker himself and to anyone who
listened.'O° Wayland's psychology was much like Hobhouse's: "Familiarity
with wrong," Wayland wrote, "diminishes our abhorrence of it."'' 5 It was
best to keep the fact of crime hidden, for knowledge of crime tended to corrupt
the knower. In this sense, public knowledge of crime was, for Wayland, not
all that different from "sell[ing]; or lend[ing], or exhibit[ingj obscene or
lascivious pictures."' 6 The human mind had a natural tendency toward
depravity that exposure to the sinful would tend to unchain. One French
reformer put the point in a way that showed how much nineteenth-century
lawyers valued their progress beyond the rough sexual justice of the premodern
world:
Cruelty in punishment, born of cruelty in the mores of society, makes
those mores yet more brutal in turn .... This is all the more true if
indecency is mingled with the punishment in question, if the victim
becomes the plaything of the populace, as in the case of certain
99. 1 id. at 113-14.
100. See id. at 11-12.
101. W.M.T., Going To See a Man Hanged, 22 FRASER'S MAG. FOR TOWN & COUNTRY 150, 158
(1840)
102. FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE (Joseph L. Blau ed., Harvard Univ.
Press 1963) (1835).
103. Id. at 246.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 241. For an interesting precursor to this 19th-century idea, see the animadversions of I
THORILLON, IDE.S SUR LES Loix CRIMINELLES, OU L'ON PROPOSE 460 LoIx NOUVELLES EN PLACE DE
CELLES QUI EXISTENT AUJOURD'HUI 109 (Paris, 1788). Though Thorillon saw much to commend in the
publicity of punishment generally, see, e.g., id. at 143-44, he argued that pederasts should be punished in
secrecy, see id. As Thorillon wrote: "M. G*** observed to me in this respect, that it is always found that,
the more publicity one gave to the punishment of pederasts, the more the offenders multiplied ..... Id.
(translation by author). An early version of this argument, offered by Rush, interestingly assumed that
public punishments might deprave if inflicted on the innocent. See RUSH, supra note 74, at 14.
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punishments inflicted on women who had forgotten their role of
submissiveness in the family.' 7
Fully exploring these Victorian ideas would take more time than I can give
in this Essay. Nevertheless, we can paint at least a general sketch of the
worldview of these authors in a few strokes. What they had in common was
an honorable nineteenth-century ambition: the ambition to guarantee a higher
"spiritual" existence for human beings. Their image of the "'civilized" world
was much like the image of a "civilized" world that we find in the works of
Sigmund Freud. It was a world in which human beings had to struggle hard,
and unceasingly, to control animal instincts of "sensuality [and] ferocity."'10
It was a world in which the goal of human social order was to rein in the beast
within. The problem with public punishment, according to those who viewed
the world in this way, was that it "tickled and excited" bestial instincts."
The display of a criminal paraded base and animal ways, just as public spitting
or public urination paraded base and animal ways; all tended to loosen the
fetters of decent comportment."' 0
Much of what these authors had to say was thus inevitably about the
"brutalization" of the crowd. But their arguments also contained an important
dignitary argument about the offender. As Molnes put it, making the offender
the center of a public display "abase[d]" him."' Or as Hobhouse put it,
making the offender a public example of "sensuality [and] ferocity" reduced
the offender to something subhuman;- 12 it made the offender an embodiment
of that above which "decent" society strove to rise.
107. J. TISSOT, INTRODUCTION HISTORIQ'E k L'TUDE Dt DROIT 100 (Pans. Libraine de Marescq
Aind 1875) (translation by author).
108. I HOBHOUSE, supra note 98, at 114; see supra text accompanying note 99
109. Id.
110. Cf. BtRENGER, DEs MOYENS PROPRES k GLNtRALISER EN FRANCE LE S STEMi P1LNraN1'AIRE
34-35 (Paris, Imprimerie Royale 1836) (describing at great length, and ,. ith great indignation, the trooping
of near-naked convicts through the French countryside). As B6renger described it, the convicts marched.
singing obscene songs, venting ferocious cnes, insulting the populations gathenng and premsing
around them, and so offering, with all it% problems. Nith all its dangers, for others and for
themselves, this hideous tableau of a long public exposition throughout our region, a tableau
revolting for all those who witness it. and which dangerously troubles consciencers that ae not
sturdy, teaching them that after all, human justice is not as temfying as they thought and
that even expiation has its bright side and its pleasures'
Id. (translation by author).
11. MOLtNES, supra note 88, at 401; see supra text accompanying note 92
112. 1 HOBHOUSE, supra note 98. at 114: see supra text accompanying note 47 Along the same lines.
compare the following remarks of de Bastard on the practice of branding:
[The goal of all legislation is to develop in man the sentiment of that moral dignity that raises
him above all the beings of creation; and a punishment that branded that feeling do%%n to its
source, that abases the human soul by depriving it of the power to reclaim itself, in the eyes of
society, from crime and infamy, would run counter to the purpose of the legislator The
punishment of the marque does not brand the body alone of the criminal. it makes his moral
being base and vile ....
CODE PIfNAL PROGRESSIF, supra note 25. at 91 (translation by author).
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Now, if I have captured the Victorian argument adequately, I think we
should acknowledge that it was a deep one, founded in a very subtle
psychology. This is true even of Sumner's fascination with bodily functions,
as we can see if we reflect upon Max Scheler's revealing late-Victorian
account of the phenomenology of shame. Shame, Scheler declared at the outset
of a lengthy discussion, involves "a sudden reverting of our attention to the
body, that dark constant companion of our existence-a reverting of our
attention to the animal-like existence of the body, so narrowly circumscribed
in time and space, with its whole crowd of bodily necessities."" 3 From this
point of view, all displays of bodily functions and of sinful human tendencies
are animal or subhuman. If we can see shame in this Victorian way, we can
understand why public display of the offender seemed akin to public spitting.
More broadly, we can understand why public display of the offender seemed
"indecent." In fact, if we can see shame in this Victorian way, we may develop
a sounder grasp of why shame sanctions take the particular ritual forms they
do. Premodern shame sanctions did, in fact, have a kind of carnivalesque,
orgiastic quality, a quality which suggests a connection between shame and the
"bodily functions." Indeed, it is clear that many of the premodern punishments
involved more or less explicit symbols of sex and excretion: Offenders were
displayed nude, made symbolically to defecate, and otherwise offered up to the
public as sexual beings. 114 The merriment surrounding these punishments was
akin to the other public amusements that William Graham Sumner found
outrageous. '
Moreover, these Victorian insights illuminate more than just premodern
public punishments. Indeed, it should be recalled that sexual and "morals"
offenses continue to play a prominent role in the shame sanctions of our own
society. Current American shame sanctions do indeed exhibit, even define,
immoral behavior for us. The Victorian distaste for public shaming that I have
described is thus directly relevant to our own current problem. Indeed, if we
look at our society through Victorian eyes, we may begin to acquire a deeper
sense of why our shame sanctions focus so much upon sex offenses.
Could we, then, revive this dignitary argument against shame sanctions?
The Victorians, after all, grasped the dignitary dilemma of existence as an
"animal being" in ways that tend to escape us. The Victorian psychologists
may also have been right in believing that public display of "immorality" can
113. SCHELER, supra note 48, at 68. I should emphasize that there is more to Scheler's argument than
I summarize here. I speak only of his efforts to trace the roots of shame to the body, without discussing
his efforts to trace the ramifying branches of shame. If we can see the world in Scheler's way, we can
grasp why Sumner would think of public shaming as similar to public spitting: Both involved an indecent
focus upon "the animal-like existence of the body." Id.; cf WILLIAM IAN MILLER, TIE ANATOMY OF
DISGUST (1997) (attempting to show the roots of social organization in forms of disgust).
114. See, e.g., I HANS VON HENTIG, DIE STRAFE 413 (1954); sources cited supra note 47.
115. Compare BURKE, supra note 47, at 197-98 (describing the "carnivalesque ... performances"
accompanying public executions), with supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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undermine the viewer's self-control. The Victorians, moreover, understood the
way in which making the offender a public example of someone who cannot
control himself violates that offender's dignity. They mounted what was an
honorable effort to found social morality on the maintenance of a carefully
patrolled distinction between the human and the animal. What is more, unlike
the eighteenth-century reformers, they actually succeeded in eliminating the
practice of public humiliation. Could we, then, mount a neo-Victorian critique
of shame?
Probably not, for no more complicated reason than that we are no longer
Victorians. The belief that we should hide away our sins and our bodily
functions is simply gone. Indeed, if we are looking for an explanation for the
resurgence of shame sanctions in America, we might well begin with the more
general decline of embarrassment about animal functions that has characterized
our daily life. We cheerfully expose our bodily functions, constantly speaking,
as it were, with our mouths full; we spit in public, and our popular culture
draws more and more on the humor of the bedroom and the bathroom. It is
part and parcel of these developments that, when we see the names of morals
offenders published in the daily newspaper, we experience a kind of premodern
merriment where President Wayland of Brown would have asked us to
experience embarrassment or disgust. When we see a published list of the
names of prostitutes' johns, we gawk without embarrassment. Victorian
"spiritual" dignity is gone throughout society; so it is that we remain
undisturbed to the extent that shame sanctions deprive offenders of their
Victorian "spiritual" dignity. Deep though the psychological arguments of the
Victorians were, they help us little, at least in the context of pure humiliation
sanctions. To proclaim that shame sanctions cannot be tolerated because they
promote an ethic of the display of the human body and of the celebration of
bodily existence is, in our society, no more than a non sequitur.
Nineteenth-century ideas of human dignity, however powerful they may
have been, are thus not likely to do us much good in explaining the ill of
shame sanctions today. We have lost the world of Victorian bodily delicacy as
completely as we have lost the world of established social hierarchy.
III. THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION
Whatever shifts may have occurred in our social psychology, the fact is
that the leading classical liberal arguments from dignity do not seem to carry
much weight any longer. What else is there? Seeking other classical arguments
against shame sanctions, we can move a step away from the classical liberal
tradition toward something of a different tenor and with a longer history: the
Christian tradition. Here we can identify an uncommonly provocative Christian
claim, namely that there is a tradeoff between shame and guilt and that it is
better for the penal system to instill the latter than the former. The problem
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with shame sanctions, on this Christian line of argument, is that they are not
guilt sanctions.
This line of argument is much older than anything I have considered so far
in this Essay. The idea that public shaming should be replaced by private
penance is one that has recurred periodically over the long history of western
Christianity. It may indeed date back to the early Middle Ages, and perhaps
even earlier."Y6 Certainly, it is possible to trace the Christian drive to
eliminate public shaming to the confessional revolution of the thirteenth
century, when the Church made a concerted effort to establish private
confession as its normal means of maintaining moral discipline.' 17 The place
to discipline offenders, on this view, was not in public but in the "internal
forum" of the conscience, where the penitent could hear the voice of God and
amend his conduct. Christians sharing this view saw public shaming as a
danger many centuries before the French Revolution.
Not surprisingly, this long Christian tradition of favoring private penance
over public humiliation has played a role in the decline of western shame
sanctions." 8 The influence of this tradition is evident, for example, in the
work of the earliest enlightened opponent of shame sanctions whom I have
been able to identify: G.G. Titius of Leipzig, who tried in the early eighteenth
century both to reorder the law of the Protestant churches and to bring about
an abolition of public humiliation." 9 The influence of the Christian tradition
is evident as well, however, in much of the agitation of the great era of reform,
decades after Titius wrote. This is particularly true, of course, with respect to
the movement to establish the penitentiary, especially in Pennsylvania where,
116. See generally HENRY CHARLES LEA, A HISTORY OF AURICULAR CONFESSION AND INDULGENCES
IN THE LATIN CHURCH (Greenwood Press 1968) (1896); JOHN T. MCNEILL & HELENA M. GAMER,
MEDIEVAL HANDBOOKS OF PENANCE 4-50 (Columbia Univ. Press 1990) (1938).
117. See MARY C. MANSFIELD, THE HUMILIATION OF SINNERS 1-17 (1995); John Bossy, The Social
History of Confession in the Age of the Reformation, in 25 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC'Y (5th set.)
21 (1975).
118. See IGNATIEFF, supra note 45, at 44-79.
119. See Titius's annotations in SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE OFFICIO HOMINIS ET CIVIS SECUNDUM
LEGEM NATURALEM LIBRI Duo, CUM OBSERVATIONIBUS EV. OTTONIS Er GOTTrL. GERH. TITII 822 n.g
(Leiden, Luchtmans 1769). As Titius wrote: "[Ain absurd form of punishment that, when it is inflicted on
the living, does not emend the delinquent, but rather renders them unfit for acting rightly." Id. (translation
by author). One can see in this passage, specifically in the term "emend," the Christian beginnings of what
would become the familiar sociological argument. See also Ernst Landsberg, G.G. Thils, in 38
ALLGEMEINE DEUTSCHE BIOGRAPHIE 379 (Dunkner & Humblot 1971) (1894) (discussing Titius's campaign
against shame sanctions). The Christian content of Titius's argument is reflected clearly in Thomasius's
response to Titius. See THOMASIUS, AN POENAE VIVENTIUM, supra note 80, reprinted in 4
DISSERTATIONES, supra note 80, at 546. Thomasius asked whether Titius's views were not simply those
of an Arminian and a natural law Lutheran of the style of Wittenberg. See id. For another text of the
period, apparently from Wittenberg, which attempts to develop a Protestant foundation for the rejection of
shame sanctions, see JUSTIN CLEMENS, GEWISSENHAFTE ANMERCKUNGEN VON DEM AMTE EINER
CHRISTLICHEN OBRIOKEIT/SONDERLICH DIE IN BEZIEHUNG AUF GOTrLICH- UND WELTLICHE RECIITE
EINGEFOHRTE STRAFFEN DER UBELTHATER BETREFFEND: ALLEN CHRISTLICH-GESINNTEN RICHTERN UND




under Quaker inspiration,120 the most famous of schemes to take the offender
out of the public eye and leave him alone with his conscience was born.' -'
This movement was inextricably bound up with the decline of shame sanctions:
The penitentiary movement conceived of and presented itself as an enlightened,
Christian alternative to the older system of shame sanctions, one that would
replace the primitive order of public display and shame with a modern order
of isolation and guilt.2
What is left of this once powerfully influential line of argument? Very
little, and for several reasons. First, and perhaps foremost, this argument more
than any other has run aground on our experience of prisons. There are surely
very few people who believe any longer that prisons serve as "penitentiaries"
of the kind they were intended to be, as places of monastic isolation where the
quiet, persistent voice of the offender's conscience would teach him to know
guilt.
Even beyond the practical failure of penitentiaries, however, the Christian
argument rests, like others I have discussed,'23 on a notion of shame that is
no longer easy to accept. The idea that shame is public whereas guilt is private
is an idea that has been very widely abandoned. Nor do all psychologists
believe that there is a necessary tradeoff between the two: that a person tends
to experience either shame or guilt alone. 2'  Similarly, cultural
anthropologists and historians have retreated from the view that there is a sharp
distinction between "shame cultures" and "guilt cultures" and that the first tend
to metamorphose into the second as norms once enforced through public
shaming are internalized.'2 Most social scientists now view shame and guilt
as generally coexisting and see comparatively little use in thinking of "guilt"
as "internalized shame."
Even leaving all that aside, the old Christian argument cannot serve our
needs any longer for the simplest of reasons: Our society is no longer the sort
of Christian society it once was. Perhaps, if we were all believing Christians,
we might accept a view of guilt as an emotion experienced only in isolation.
Perhaps we might view the morally lesser "public" experience of shame and
120. See, e.g., IGNATIEFF, supra note 45, at 58-59.
121. Indeed, most of the early penitentiaries, which aimed to place the offender in omething
equivalent to the monastic penitential cell, were avowedly Christian (and all of them '%crc at least
recognizably Christian). See id. at 44-79.
122. See id.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
124. See, e.g., Peer Hultberg, Sharne-A Hidden Emotion. 33 J. ANALYTCAL PSYCIOL- 109. 115-16
(1988).
125. See PIERS & SINGER, supra note 48. at 60-61 (noting that Indian culture, a -suppo-sd "'shamc
culture," possesses patterns of guilt): WILLIAts. supra note 52. at 91 (dicussing the complexiti s of the
idea of a "shame culture"); Hultberg, supra note 124. at 113-14 (dticussing the impossibility of
distinguishing between shame and guilt cultures). For examples of the old approach. see RUt' BENEDICTr.
THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD 222-24 (1946): and E.R. DODDS. THE GREEKS AND THIE
IRRATIONAL 17-43 (1951).
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the morally greater "internal" experience of guilt as true alternatives. But we
are not, collectively at least, believing Christians of that kind.
IV. POLITICAL ARGUMENTS
The arguments against shame sanctions I have touched on so far could be
called social arguments-arguments about the deep structure of social relations,
about matters that stand outside the ordinary purview of political theory. Let
me now turn to more conventional political arguments-in particular, to the
great liberal political thinkers, Wilhelm von Humboldt and John Stuart Mill,
their not-entirely-liberal precursor Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and their statist-
authoritarian counterparts as well.
We have seen that the classical arguments focusing on the need to abolish
shame sanctions as a matter of social reform no longer seem to carry weight.
Society has changed too much since the early nineteenth century-and
changed, arguably, in precisely the ways that have made the resurgence of
shame sanctions possible. We put little effort into raising ourselves above the
animal life of our bodily functions; outward status distinctions, if they still
survive, are so hazily perceived that we can hardly describe them; and the grip
of Christianity on our society, or at least of a Christianity strongly oriented
toward the individual conscience, has been very deeply shaken. The ideas that
shame sanctions are physically "abasing," socially undignified, or inimical to
the inculcation of guilt, have lost much of their force as a result. In the 1840s,
it was obvious to enlightened persons such as Mol~nes that inflicting shame
sanctions was an illiberal way of treating offenders, but today the same thing
is no longer obvious at all. We have lost too much of the sense that shaming
others is not a decent way to act.
Let us then turn away from what I have broadly called social reformist
arguments, toward the more familiar sort of political reformist arguments-
arguments about the wise and proper use of state power. Here we do well to
begin with the classic statist-authoritarian argument of the European tradition
before we come to the classical argument of European liberalism.
The statist-authoritarian argument grew out of the experience of state-
building. It is an argument purely about policing: Exposing offenders to the
public, the argument runs, is likely to excite the crowd so much that it causes
rioting, and when there is rioting, the state loses control. Strains of the
argument recurred throughout the eighteenth century in both the United States
and Great Britain, particularly in connection with public executions; the history
of this argument in the Anglo-American world has been much studied. 26 But
126. See, e.g., IGNATIEFF, supra note 45, at 23-24 (questioning the efficacy of public hangings at
Tyburn as a deterrent because they inverted the ritual "from a solemn act of the state to a popular
bacchanal"); 4 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 82, at 345 (quoting Mandeville in 1725 warning that the frequent
executions at Tyburn were "exemplary the Wrong Way"). For an excellent treatment of the history of
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it is important to trace this argument in the long history of Continental Europe
too, where the abolition of shame sanctions was more official and more
permanent and where concerns about crowd management were more
consistently articulated in contexts other than public executions.
Some of the most striking arguments on this front were French ones. The
theme of crowd control was not the issue of the day in eighteenth-century
France, where critics of shame sanctions focused on very different
problems. 27 But the crowd control theme became important during the most
intensively abolitionist period in France, from around 1825 to 1848. For
example, it was argued during the debates after the Revolution of 1830 that
shame sanctions were not suitable for use in large cities: While in the
countryside they made a "profound and solemn impression," in the cities they
"excited the evil passions of the populace," creating difficult problems for the
police.
2 8
This style of authoritarian argument could be found, in subsequent
decades, in other parts of Continental Europe as well. It enjoyed a particularly
interesting career in Nazi Germany. '29 It is hardly surprising that various
Nazis and Nazi sympathizers were eager to see shame sanctions reinstituted.
Shame sanctions fit, after all, the general national socialist spirit of parade,
display, and humiliation. In addition, they fit the spirit of the Nazi order that
included both dramatic public rallies and the enforced wearing of badges like
the yellow star.' 30 At the time of the Nazi seizure of power, prominent legal
thinkers, such as Georg Dahm, began to propose shame sanctions as the
natural enforcement technique of an antiliberal society.' 3' As Dahm saw it,
where liberty had been the highest good of the old liberal order, honor was
now the highest good of the new Nazi order.' 32 Shame sanctions, which
deprived offenders of honor, should accordingly be the Nazi punishment of
public executions, see Steven Wilf. Imagining Justice: Aesthetics and Public Executions in Late Eighteenth-
Century England, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 51 (1993).
127. The dominant complaint with respect to shame sanctions in 18th-century France seems to have
been that shaming afflicted not only the offender, but also the offender's family. See. e g .LACRETELL-.
supra note 80, passim; VOUGLANS, supra note 69. at 836.
128. CODE PtNAL PROGRESSIF, supra note 25. at 126 (translation by author), cf id at 130 (remarks
of FRlix Ral) (admitting that shame sanctions are likely to be more effectise in prosncial settings. but
nevertheless seeing dangers in inflicting them even there). The same observation can also be found in
FIELDING, reprinted in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF HENRY FIELDING. supra note 80. at 122
129. The story here is, as far as I can discover, little studied. Cf.. e.g. INGO LL tIER. HILaR'S
JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REIcH 78-79 (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans.. Harsard Um Press
1991) (1987) (discussing the advocacy of shame sanctions by prominent Nazi scholars but neglecting to
note that, in practice, such shame sanctions did not ultimately come into use)
130. See ESSER, supra note 24. at 72 (discussing the yellow star used by the Nazis to identify Jews)
For the use of pillorization by the Nazis against Jews in particular, see RICHARD LA%%sRE%CE MILL R. NAZI
JUsTiz 60-64 (1995).
131. See Georg Dahm, Die Erneuerung der Ehrenstrafe. 39 DEL'sCsHE JL RISTE%-ZE!T. ,G 821. 826-27
(1934); see also HERBERT MANTLER, EN'%,ICKLUNG UND BEDEL'TUNGSWANDEL DER EIIRE.NSTRAFE SEIT
BEGINN DES NEUNZEHNTEN JAHRHUNDERTS. UNTER BESONDERER BERLCKSICMGLG DER
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN STRAFRECHTSREFORM 56-64 (1936).
132. See Dahm, supra note 131, at 827.
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choice. What was promoted by university Nazis like Dahm was also promoted
by back-alley Nazis like the followers of Ernst Rohm. The Sturmabteilung
(SA), the brownshirted Nazi private army, made attempts in 1933 and 1934 to
reintroduce the pillory and other shame sanctions, grabbing offenders and
subjecting them to various kinds of medievalizing public humiliation .
33
In early 1934, as all this transpired, one might have supposed that shame
sanctions would become the Nazi norm. Nevertheless, strikingly, the
authoritarian tradition won out. By the mid- and late-1930s, it became clear
that Nazi legal opinion would not tolerate pure humiliation sanctions. To be
sure, Nazi legal thinkers promoted a wide range of punishments intended to
diminish the "honor" of the offender, 34 but they rejected pure humiliation
sanctions in terms that provocatively mixed the language of statism with the
language of Victorian moralizing. Thus, Roland Freisler, a leading Nazi jurist
and functionary, congratulated the SA in 1934 for having performed the
"service" of reintroducing medievalizing shame sanctions, a "very effective
form of punishment."' 135 Nevertheless, he opposed any full-scale use of such
sanctions done in any way except under supervision of the state. "There exists
the danger," he wrote, "that it will become a public entertainment for part of
the population."'' 36 Good Nazi legal practice could not countenance the
reappearance of the carnivalesque law of the Middle Ages. Freisler proposed,
instead, that criminals be exposed before the place of judgment, where
"disciplined organisations"--presumably Nazi brownshirts-could march
before them in formation. 137 Others too thought that it was better to avoid
problems by conducting humiliation ceremonies only in the presence of SA
and Schutzstaffel (SS) troops, keeping the public out. 138 Anything else,
explained one author, in a weird echo of Victorian moralizing, would arouse
"base instincts" and lead to "brutalization and the desire to gawk" in
public. 39
These Nazi concerns were not precisely those of eighteenth-century
England or of nineteenth-century France; the threat that these Nazis perceived
was less the threat of a riot than the threat of a carnivalesque revel.
Nevertheless, despite their differences, the Nazis did belong to the statist
133. See LOTHER GRUCHMANN, JusTIz IM DRITTEN REICH 1933-1940: ANPASSUNO UND
UNTERWERFUNG IN DER ARA GORTNER 336-45, 376-77 (1988).
134. See ALFRED KETrELER, DIE ERNEUERUNG DER EHRENSTRAFE 50 (1937) (explaining the honor
content of different Nazi execution practices).
135. Roland Freisler, Strafensystem, in DENKSCHRIFT DES ZENTRALAUSSCHUSSES DER
STRAFRECHTSABTEILUNG DER AKADEMIE FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT OBER DIE GRUNDZOGE EINES
ALLGEMEINEN DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS 100, 113-14 (Freisler & Luetgebrune eds., 1934) (translation by
author).
136. Id. at 114.
137. Id.
138. The Akademie fur Deutsches Recht made one such proposal. See KETIELER, supra note 134, at
56.
139. Id. (translation by author).
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tradition: They too, like the nineteenth-century French, worried that public
shaming would undermine the ability of the state to control the crowd.
Statist policing concerns were obviously very powerful-powerful enough
to overcome strong ideological tendencies even among the Nazis. Should the
same policing concerns also inform our thinking in America today? I am going
to end by suggesting that, in fact, there is some real wisdom in this
Continental policing argument. But for the moment let me make the obvious
point that, in its pure original form, the classic policing argument does not
carry much weight in American discourse. We are certainly concerned about
urban rioting. We are, moreover, particularly concerned about riots caused by
acts of the legal system, as the recent history of Los Angeles shows. If,
therefore, we were to imagine that the problem faced by French and German
administrators is not our problem, we would be wrong. One need only consider
the crowd management problems that might result from the imposition of
shame sanctions on, for example, African-American offenders in Los Angeles
to recognize that the risk of riot is real.
Nevertheless, I take it that in the American tradition, there is a consensus
that the government cannot permit itself to be guided in its decisionmaking by
fear of riots. Unlike lawyers in the Continental world, we are not prepared to
think that the imperative of maintaining order alone justifies any particular
method of applying justice. Crowd management, for us, is an incidental
problem that may be created in the pursuit of the right and just result. If
inflicting shame sanctions seemed to us, on independent grounds, the right
thing to do, I take it that we would inflict them even at the cost of rioting,
which we would attempt to control by other means. Indeed, such has been our
recent history with respect to various laws like Megan's Law in New
Jersey,140 which have been passed (and upheld) despite the acknowledgement
that vigilantism is a real danger. 4' On a deeper level, perhaps, we are far
less willing than the Germans or the French to deny the crowd its say, even
its violent say.
If the authoritarian political argument seems weak in the American context,
the same is perhaps not true of the last argument that I will review here: the
classical liberal political argument. We can trace from Rousseau (odd
progenitor of a liberal tradition though he may seem) through Humboldt to
Mill the claim that the government can never in practice succeed in imposing
shame. This classical liberal argument is akin, in some ways, to the argument
140. Registration and Community Notification Laws. N.J. STAT AN s. §§ 2C 7-1 to -II (Vcst 1995
& Supp. 1997).
141. See, e.g., Russell v. Gregoire. No. 96-35398. 1997 U.S App. LEXIS 23074. at *29 (9th Cir. Sept
4, 1997) (discussing WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.550(I) (1990)): E.B. v. Vcmiero. 119 F3d 1077 (3d Cir
1997) (discussing New Jersey's Megan's Law); id. at 1089 n.7 (minimizing the relcance of instances of
"harassment" of released offenders); see also Krcmer. supra note 57, at 3942 (noting that disclosure raises
the possibility of private violence).
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from modernity, for it is also an argument from impossibility. But the classical
liberal thinkers, unlike the sociological advocates of the argument from
modernity, did not believe that there could be no shame-based enforcement in
modem society. On the contrary, they believed that shame remained a highly
effective tool of enforcement, even in modem western societies. But they held
that shame was an enforcement tool to be used by society alone, not by the
state. Indeed, in its classic form, as developed by Rousseau (in a famous, and
characteristically elusive, passage from Letter to M. d'Alembert on the
Theatre142) and any number of followers,'43 this argument held that the
state's efforts to impose shame might even backfire. The state could never
order members of society to regard private persons either with respect or
contempt, for public opinion formed its own judgments about the merit of
private persons, judgments over which the state could not have the slightest
influence.' 44 Humboldt offered a classic declaration of this idea in his The
Limits of State Action, 14 and Humboldt's influence shows in a work he
famously influenced, Mill's On Liberty,146 in which Mill sought principally
to explain the proper disciplinary roles of public opinion and the law,
respectively. 1
47
Such is the grand old liberal argument. There is certainly some strength in
it; I will say in a moment where I think that strength lies. But the argument
also contains some considerable weaknesses. First, anyone who has lived in the
twentieth century has to be less sure of the stability and independence of
public opinion than these liberal writers were. Rousseau, Humboldt, and Mill
lived before the Nazi period and, more broadly, before the advent of modern
mass politics and the modern media. They had little conception of how
dramatically propaganda and publicity can manipulate public opinion-not only
propaganda like the anti-Semitic writings of the Nazis, but also such images
as the televised arrests of Wall Street traders. 48 Modern propaganda may,
in the end, fail to achieve its intended effect, but its effect remains strong quite
long enough to destroy many individual lives. Moreover, in a modern society,
there is no defined "public" circumscribed enough to form discrete opinions
about most particular individuals; it is simply not the case that a person
142. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, POLITICS AND THE ARTS: LETTER TO M. D'ALEMBERT ON TIlE
THEATRE 67-75 (Allan Bloom trans., The Free Press of Glencoe, III. 1960) (1758) (discussing the difficulty
of guiding public opinion in the context of the campaign to repress dueling).
143. For the influence of Rousseau's argument, see, for example, NIOCHE, supra note 72, at 62-63;
and THORILLON, supra note 106, at 65.
144, A measure of the degree to which this idea could be vulgarized can be taken from BOITARD,
supra note 43, at 53. For an elegant statement by a great German jurist, see KARL BINDING, DIE EHRE IM
RECHTSSINN UND IHRE VERLETZBARKEIT 22 (Leipzig, Alexander Edelmann 1890).
145. HUMBOLDT, supra note 74, at 112.
146. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1975) (1859).
147. See, e.g., id. at 70 (explaining when offenders may "be justly punished by opinion, though not
by law").
148. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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shamed by the state can count on the public to recognize his true innocence
and honor. But even if this were the case, the classical liberal argument would
be powerful only with respect to the government's power to punish those
deemed by society, for whatever reason, innocent. Such cases may exist, but
they surely comprise a tiny minority that should not guide our routine thinking.
There is something amiss in any theory of punishment that begins by denying
that the offender is guilty.
V. CONCLUSION
All of this leaves us-leaves me at any rate-in a state of some intellectual
embarrassment. We feel-I feel-an intuitive certainty that there is something
disturbing about shame sanctions, that shame sanctions somehow diminish the
offender's dignity in the wrong way and that they somehow make the wrong
kind of appeal to the crowd. Yet we can spend a great deal of time rummaging
through the grand old arguments against shame sanctions and still come up
short.
So what is the argument against shame sanctions?
Let me pull together a few strands from the various arguments that I have
touched on and try to weave out of them something that seems right. First,
there are two aspects to what is troubling about shame sanctions: their effect
on the offender and their effect on the crowd. We tend, in our rights-oriented
society, to begin by reasoning from the first. But let us try to begin our
reasoning from the second.
The classic political objections we have just reviewed agree on one
proposition: The government cannot control fully the actions and the affect of
the crowd as it wishes. Such is the liberal tradition of Humboldt and Mill;
such, for that matter, is the statist tradition to be found in France and
Germany. There is an important difference, though, between the two: Whereas
the liberal tradition tends to hold that the government cannot control the
opinions of the public, the statist tradition tends to hold that the government
cannot control the actions of and the effect upon the public. The liberal
tradition holds, as it were, that the public will tend to remain an unmastered
public; the statist tradition holds that the public will tend to become an
uncontrollable mob. The liberal tradition imagines a public with well-educated
moral sensibilities, with the deep reserves of self-control of a Calvinist
congregation, and with the ability to form its own judgments about miscreants.
The statist tradition, by contrast, imagines a public that is always ready to
riot.'49
149. Mill, it should be noted, was closer to the statist tradition in this sense than Humboldt was See
MILL, supra note 146, at 68-69 (expressing a suspicion of the mass public)
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The experience of the last century has made the liberal version of this
tradition seem dubious. It is difficult, in light of some hard experience, to
believe that the state cannot succeed in destroying reputations. It is hard, more
generally, to believe that the state cannot succeed in stirring up the passions
of the crowd against individuals. It was the very policy of Maoist shame
sanctions, for example, to do exactly that. Nor need we go as far afield as
China. We need speak only of our country's own practices. Does anyone really
doubt that our own shame sanctions, whether directed against sex offenders or
drunk drivers, have some impact on "public opinion" about that person?
The statist version of this tradition, by contrast, still seems to have a kernel
of truth in it. Once the state stirs up public opprobrium against an offender, it
cannot really control the way the public treats that offender. Indeed, in the
most controversial area of current American practices, the sexual predator
notification statutes of the Megan's Law type, debate has come forcefully, and
I think rightly, to revolve around the risk of lynching in various forms.50
The government, in this context, may indeed create something akin to riots, as
in the painful case in which an innocent man was assaulted by attackers who
wrongly supposed him to be a released child molester.' 5' But I do not wish
to rest my argument on the danger of literal riots, for it is essential that we
grasp what is wrong even with far less dramatic cases than the sorts of child
molestation that are the usual stuff of laws like Megan's Law. Even where
there is no threat of rioting, the state has no control over the sort of abuse the
public will deal out to a shamed offender. When our government dangles a sex
offender or a drunk driver before the public, it has vanishingly little control
over how the public treats the person. Riots are by no means the only danger.
Other things happen too-things that are more difficult to detect and therefore
more disturbing. Who knows how private persons will treat the shamed john,
the shamed merchant, the shamed shoplifter, the shamed drunk driver? Who
knows how private persons, given the right to play policemen, will behave?
It is here, I think, that we begin to approach the heart of what is troubling
about shame sanctions: They involve a dangerous willingness, on the part of
the government, to delegate part of its enforcement power to a fickle and
uncontrolled general populace. Even in their mildest American form, shame
sanctions amount to a kind of posse-raising legal politics, with all of the risks
150. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
151. See Jon Nordheimer, 'Vigilante' Attack in New Jersey Is Linked to Sex-Offenders Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. II, 1995, at AI. But cf Andy Newman, Megan, Her Law and What It Spawned, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 1996, § 13 (New Jersey), at I (quoting the New Jersey Attorney General stating, "We've done
86 notifications and had only one reported act of vigilantism"). For less dramatic examples of lynch justice,
see John T. McQuiston, Sex Offender Is Suing His Neighbors over Protests, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1997,
at BI (describing rallies held to protest the presence of a sex offender in the community, an incident in
which a brick was thrown through the ex-offender's car window, and harassing calls to the ex-offender's
employer).
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that implies. They are, at base, a form of officially sponsored lynch
justice, 5 1 meted out by courts that have given up on the obligation of the
state both to define what is criminal and to administer criminal sanctions itself.
Of course, it is easy to understand how courts have come to this point. We
all believe the state is doing a bad job of administering criminal sanctions and
that our prisons, in particular, are lousy institutions. Why not turn certain
limited classes of offenders over to the public? Why not discipline sexual
misbehavior, commercial misbehavior, and the like, through techniques of
humiliation that are often likely to be effective and to bring many offenders
into line with what we think are norms of public comportment? Why not turn
such offenders over to be judged by the established norms of public opinion?
The right answer, I think, recognizes shaming as a form of lynch justice
and acknowledges both the personal and the political dangers that state-
encouraged lynch justice raises. The right answer acknowledges three things:
first, that it is a mistake to imagine that there are established norms of public
opinion that go unaffected by state shaming; second, that we have far too little
control over the way the public exercises its enforcement power-far too little
control over the tendency of the public to become either a mob or a collection
of petty private prison guards; and third, that allowing state-encouraged
lynching involves a troubling tolerance for ochlocracy, for a democratic
government too susceptible to the pitch and yaw of mob psychology.
Particularly where shame sanctions are applied in the realms of sex and
commerce, they represent a misguided willingness to let the business of
government devolve to an over-volatile public-to make, in the words of a
nineteenth-century reformer, their victim a "plaything of the populace."'5 3
With respect to the first point, it is simply wrong to suppose that the
shaming state is not a maker of public norms. This is not because the
American government engages in propaganda of the Nazi or Maoist kind when
it inflicts shame sanctions. The process is subtler than any kind of calculated
propagandizing, but it is a powerful process nevertheless. Government actions
like shame sanctions change public norms; and, let us not fail to note, public
officials often seek to employ shame sanctions in order to change public
norms. Is the only effect of publishing the names of prostitutes' johns to
expose them to an existing atmosphere of condemnation? Or is the effect to
nudge prevailing views in a new, more moralistic, direction-or even simply
to consolidate what had hitherto been a more vague and less effective
consensus? Are officials who advocate publishing the names of johns simply
seeking more effective enforcement measures? Or are they promoting greater
152. For the idea that shame sanctions are a variety of lynch justice (though without the political
ramifications I discuss here), see Gustav Radbruch. Der Uebereugungsverbrecher, 44 ZEnSCIRIFr FuR
DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFr 34. 36 (1924). which descniens shame sanctions as a form of
"moral lynch justice."
153. TISSOT, supra note 107, at 100; see supra text accompanying note 107.
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political legitimacy for themselves by stirring up some mix of public
indignation and public merriment? Is the only effect of publicly shaming Wall
Street traders to draw on an existing body of righteous public indignation? Or
is it to create, or enhance, a public sense that something sinister is afoot in the
financial world and so to stir up the sort of politically powerful anti-banker
sentiment that has characterized so much of modern politics (especially in its
anti-Semitic incarnations)? These are unavoidable issues in any scheme that
involves the dangling of sexual, commercial, and first or minor offenders
before the public. Playing with public opinion on dark and volatile
psychologies like the psychologies of sex and commerce makes for a
distressingly creative politics, a politics of the dark and the volatile. 54 It is
a form of legislating and politicking in the realm of morality that goes
unchecked by any of our standard ideas about the propriety of legislating or
moralizing. It is a stirring up of the public-who knows whither?
It is also a stirring up of the public in who knows what way. The
numberless private policemen who enforce shame sanctions play by their own
rules or by none. This is a pressing problem and a problem best understood by
coming at last to the question of how shame sanctions violate the dignity of
the offender. For the dignitary claim I would like to defend is this: Subjecting
offenders to the public's unpredictable response to shame sanctions is a
violation of our modern sense of what we might call transactional dignity. It
is a deeply rooted norm of our society that persons should never be forced to
deal with wild or unpredictable partners. We have a sense that no one should
be compelled to dance with a madman, that no one should be compelled to
trade except under well-understood rules of trading. This is something very
different from bodily dignity, something different from status dignity. It is, as
it were, marketplace dignity. It is the dignity involved in having the right to
know what kind of a deal one has struck, and on what terms. It is the dignity
of the one-shot transaction-the dignity that arises from our marketplace right
to complete one deal and move on to the next one, the dignity that comes from
our right to pay off a debt once and for all and be done with our creditor."5
When the state turns an offender over to the public, it robs him of that
transactional dignity. There is no way to predict or control the way in which
the public will deal with him, no rhyme or limit to the terms the public may
154. This objection is touched upon in the title, but disappointingly little in the text, of Kenneth
Crimaldi, Note, "Megan's Law": Election-Year Politics and Constitutional Rights, 27 RUTGERS L.. 169,
204 (1995). For an elegant discussion of the broader constitutional problems raised by government
disclosure, with an emphasis on the demagogic dangers revealed by the experience of the McCarthy era,
see Kreimer, supra note 57, at 15-25.
155. What I have called "marketplace dignity" could also be conceptualized differently. The law, we
might say, must always choose between characterizing transactions and characterizing persons. The problem
with shame sanctions, as I have described them here, is that they characterize the person rather than the
offense. They consign the offender to a new, lesser status. In this sense, they exclude the offender entirely
from the life of ordinary transactions, just as members of shunned classes are excluded everywhere from
the simple dignity of admission to the marketplace.
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impose. Shame sanctions, in this regard, are very different from prisons or
fines. However much prisons may have declined into chaos, they are in
principle controllable. However monstrous they may have become, we all agree
that the state has the duty to manage them: to establish rules, to call review
boards, to answer complaints in court. None of that apparatus exists to control
the enforcement of shame. This means that, though courts may wish to
abandon the prison system and switch to a system of shaming, they must not
be permitted to do so. Doing so means abandoning their obligation to maintain
a monopoly of the means of power-it means abandoning their duty to be the
imposers of measured punishment.
Shame sanctions thus do represent a deprivation of dignity in a sense that
is meaningful for our society, and perhaps that is enough to resolve the
question. But there is more to the matter than that, and I would not like to end
by speaking of the offender's dignity. It is important, even at the risk of
sounding what may seem a wild alarm, to recognize that public humiliation of
offenders is a politically questionable practice. If we focus only on the
offender's dignity, we will never be able to answer the question that should
trouble us most: What is it about shame sanctions that made them appealing
to Maoists, to the Taliban, to the Nazi SA? What is it that made them
appealing to the very movements that define political illiberalism for us?
The answer has to be that shame sanctions lend themselves to a politics
of stirring up demons-as the SA tried to stir up demons and as Mao tried to
stir up demons. Shame sanctions belong to a style of twentieth-century mass
politics that draws its power not from a sober public, but from a fired-up
crowd. Innocent though shame sanctions may often seem in our own country,
they carry all the dangers of a demagogic democratic politics. Of course, we
are not likely to have fascism or Maoism here. Nevertheless, it remains a
condition of democratic rule of law, and of the right of a democratic society
to punish, that we shy away from mob politics. In defining ourselves as a
liberal society, as a society different from Maoist or Nazi society, we must
accordingly remain conscious of the dangers of demagogic politics-conscious
of the impropriety of any kind of official action that plays on the irrational
urges of the public. 156 We must remember something that was apparent to
all in the nineteenth century: Democracy is never a proper form of government
unless it can count on a sober and disciplined populace. Displaying morals
offenders, commercial offenders, or first and minor offenders invites the public
to rummage in some of the ugliest corners of the human heart. That cannot be
good for healthy politics.
156. Cf Stanley S. Arkin, What Other Nations Can Teach About Crnminal Justice. N Y. L.J , Feb. 13.
1997, at 3 ("The severity of sentences imposed in the United States is much more similar to a country like
the People's Republic of China than it is to other industrialized democracies. To some extent, after all. a
nation can be judged by the company it keeps.").
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All of this provides a metric for judging shame sanctions as they appear
in our country. To the extent such sanctions proclaim the message that the
public is to serve as the agent of punishment, they will always run counter to
the norms of democratic rule of law. By this metric, we can determine which
shame sanctions are troubling, and how troubling they are. The most disturbing
shame sanctions are those that convey the message that government has
abandoned its monopoly of the power to punish crime, allowing the public to
do with the offender as it sees fit. The shame attached to a prison sentence is,
by this measure, comparatively untroubling; for a prison sentence, by its
nature, announces the government's ultimate refusal to abandon the power to
punish. 157 Shame sanctions are most objectionable, however, where they most
encourage the public to punish in an undisciplined and unthinking way.'
This means that they are especially objectionable when they are inflicted in the
sensational and politically charged realms of sex and commerce, realms in
which the public in mass democracies can lose its bearings, just as village
societies did in the premodern world.
It is essential that we carve out a realm of the political that is not about
dark psychologies of sex, not about dark suspicions directed against commerce
and money. It is essential that we carefully limit the powers we confer upon
the public to questions upon which the public can pass in a spirit of sanity and
good sense. That is why we limit the business of inflicting criminal sanctions
to criminal justice professionals. We have worked, over two liberal centuries,
to build an ethic of businesslike politics that denies our officials the authority
to pluck on the bass strings of public psychology and that makes criminal law
the province of trained and disciplined officers. Over many generations of ugly
experience, we have worked to build a democratic government that
acknowledges the importance of an ethic of restraint and sobriety. The new
shame sanctions tend to undermine that ethic, and that is a disturbing thing.
157. It is by this standard that we can distinguish various forms of the public listing of offenders'
names. The listing of offenders' names by the government is most objectionable where it most invites
undisciplined punishment by the public and where the government has effectively renounced its monopoly
over the punishment power with respect to those persons. The listing of the names of prostitutes' clients
is inappropriate, by this standard, both because it effectively abandons punishment to the public and
because it does so in the dangerous and undisciplined realm of sex. The listing by the government of the
names of other sorts of convicted persons may not, by contrast, be troubling at all, if the purpose of such
listing is simply to incapacitate the offenders in question and if the government implicitly retains its
ultimate right to punish. Moreover, the listing of names by nongovernmental officials is not objectionable
by this standard, since it does not involve the surrender of any governmental criminal punishment power.
In this sense, my argument is a kind of antidelegation doctrine. The great danger lies in the delegation of
criminal punishment powers to the general public.
158. My objections become, of course, less cogent to the extent that the public can punish in a
disciplined, professionalized way. Some citizen policing programs may, for example, be unobjectionable,
to the extent that those programs can succeed in inculcating norms of police behavior in the general public.
I register my skepticism, though, that the public can ordinarily be trained to any appropriate level of
discipline, especially when presented with the most garish of the newer shame sanctions.
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